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Abstract
In his excellent work The Assurance of things Hoped For1 surveying the
development of the understanding of “faith” in the context of the Christian
religion, Avery Dulles provides a concise sketch of the historical development
and current manifestation of seven „models‟ of faith which still have some
contemporary influence. This thesis takes each of the models of faith Dulles
presents and gives a brief description of the model; offers some preliminary
observations about the relationship between faith and reason in the respective
models; and, by examining the Church‟s teaching on faith and reason in Fides et
Ratio, discusses the relationship between faith and reason according to each
model.

1

Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For (New York, Oxford, 1994).

Table of Contents
Introduction

1

The Propositional Model

2

Preliminary thoughts on the Propositional Model

8

The Propositional Model in Fides et Ratio

11

Conclusion to the Propositional Model

17

The Transcendental Model

18

Preliminary thoughts on the Transcendental Model

24

The Transcendental Model in Fides et Ratio

26

Conclusion to the Transcendental Model

32

The Fiducial Model

33

Preliminary Thoughts on the Fiducial Model

39

The Fiducial Model in Fides et Ratio

41

Conclusion to the Fiducial Model

47

The Affective / Experiential Model

48

Preliminary thoughts on the Affective / Experiential Model

51

The Affective/Experiential model in Fides et Ratio

53

Conclusion to the Affective / Experiential Model

60

The Obediential Model

61

Preliminary thoughts on the Obediential Model

64

The Obediential Model in Fides et Ratio

66

Conclusion to the Obediential Model

71

The Praxis Model

72

Preliminary thoughts on the Praxis Model

75

The Praxis Model in Fides et Ratio

77

Conclusion to the Praxis Model

83

The Personalist Model

85

Preliminary thoughts on the Personalist Model

89

The Personalist model in Fides et Ratio

90

Conclusion to the Personalist Model

99

Thesis Conclusion

100

Bibliography

103

Models of Faith and Reason
Peter Holmes
Introduction
In his excellent work The Assurance of things Hoped For1 surveying the development of
the understanding of ―faith‖ in the context of the Christian religion, Avery Dulles
provides a concise sketch of the most important understandings or models of faith which
are still influential today. Dulles traces the historical development and current
manifestation of seven ‗models‘ of faith which still have some contemporary influence.
This thesis will take each of the models Dulles presents and give a brief description of
the model, including some examples taken from proponents of the respective models;
offer some preliminary observations about the relationship between faith and reason in
the respective models; and, finally, by examining the Church‘s teaching on faith and
reason in Fides et Ratio, discuss the relationship between faith and reason according to
each model. My specific questions here are:
Whether ―faith‖ is compatible with reason
Whether ―faith‖ requires reason.
I intend to argue that not only is faith compatible with reason, but that all models of faith
described by Dulles require reason.

This study is not attempting an historical and/or theological survey of the vast array of
theologians and philosophers who have contributed to the development of various
concepts of faith over the past two millennia. The theologians and works cited and

1

Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For (New York, Oxford, 1994).
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discussed in this thesis are presented primarily as examples of each model for the
purposes of our study. While various authors and commentators on the topic of ‗Faith
and Reason‘ and on Fides et Ratio specifically have been consulted in other sections, the
sections offering commentary on each model based on Fides et Ratio have been treated,
wherever possible, without external commentary in order to represent the Church‘s
teaching as dispassionately and clearly as possible.

Fides et Ratio
Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises
to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart
a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by
knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the
fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3;
Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2).2

The Propositional Model
The propositional ‗model‘ of faith described by Dulles is based on the assertion that it is
impossible to believe anything which is not rationally conceivable. I cannot believe, for
example, that ―blue Wednesdays fly twelve‖. Even if I memorised the words and
believed the source of this bizarre assertion to be trustworthy, I could not grasp that
which was being proposed to believe. In order to believe anything we must understand
what is to be believed. The only access we have to such objects of belief is propositions.
In this model, faith is assent to revealed truth on the authority of God who reveals, but
―what is revealed and believed must be a sentence.‖3 Swinburne makes this point
forcefully in refuting the assertion, mistakenly attributed to Tertullian, that Jesus‘ life,

2

John Paul II, “Fides et Ratio”, (hereafter F&R) in Fides et Ratio: Faith and Reason (Strathfield, St
Pauls Publications, 1998), Opening paragraph.
3
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, p172 (attributed to William Marshner)
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death and resurrection is worthy of belief because it is absurd. After showing a few ways
in which such an assertion could have been made intelligibly,4 Swinburne insists that he
would refute such a statement on the grounds that ―there are logical limits to the
possibilities for human irrationality, and even Tertullian cannot step outside them.‖5

The propositional model seems to find some support in the Scriptures. In the Old
Testament the people of Israel are invited to receive the laws of the covenant, to ―write
them on your doorframes of your houses and on your gates.‖6 The covenant of God with
his chosen people seems to take the form of specific propositions. The law is
emphatically pronounced from the stone tablets Moses brings from the mountain,
placing great emphasis on the fact they are written, literally carved in stone, for all to
see, seek to understand and to do.7 In the New Testament Christ himself affirms that all
of God‘s Word is eternal.8 He insists that man shall live ―by every word that comes from
the mouth of God.‖9

4

Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23-24.
―There are ways in which we can interpret Tertullian as making an intelligible claim. … ‗Absurd‘ could
be taken to mean ‗apparently absurd‘, and ‗impossible‘ to mean ‗impossible by normal standards‘.
Tertullian might be saying that one would not expect a true claim about a matter of very deep significance
to look plausible or likely at a first glance by the average person… he might be saying that because the
most significant and fundamental events must be very different from normal ones, they will be impossible
if one supposes that only normal events occur - so a claim about such a happening would be more likely to
be true if it concerned the apparently impossible.‖
5
Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition, 24. ―If Tertullian believes that all the evidence is against
a proposition, he must believe that that proposition is improbable, and in that case he cannot believe that it
is true. He may die rather than deny the proposition in public; he may, in some sense, plan his life on the
assumption that the proposition is true, but he does not believe it. There are logical limits to the
possibilities for human irrationality, and even Tertullian cannot step outside them.‖
6
Dt 6:9, 11:20.
7
Ex 24:7, Dt 6:6-7, Ps 19:7-11, Ps 119.
8
Mt 5:18. ―Not one letter, not the least stroke of a pen will disappear from the law.‖ cf Mt 24:35, Mk
13:31, Lk 16:17, 21:33, Isa 40:8, Ps 119:89-91.
9
Mt 4:4 (citing Dt 8:3) Emphasis mine.
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the covenant cannot be reduced to mere
propositions. It describes a relationship between God and his people. The covenant
contains a great deal more physical action or ceremony than specific propositions. The
establishment of the covenant itself includes a few verses of commandments, followed
by approximately forty chapters consisting largely of liturgical instructions.10 The
purpose of various parts of the text of the covenant notwithstanding, the text is still
written propositions. Even the liturgical instructions making up a significant proportion
of the covenant are still expressed in words, sentences and coherent propositions. Even
the poetic, at times mystical, exploration of faith in the Psalms and wisdom literature is
completely focussed on ―the Law of the Lord‖ as the central focus of faith.11 We see this
theme expanded in the New Testament, particularly in the Pastoral Epistles. Bishops are
exhorted to firmly hold and teach the ―deposit of faith‖12 and to transmit it using the
―sound pattern of words‖13 which has been handed down to them.14 In the late second
century and early third, Irenaeus and Tertullian reflect the biblical themes emphasising
doctrines proclaimed by the apostles, as proposed, interpreted and guarded by the
Church.15

10

Laws and advice on moral matters are often interwoven with liturgical instructions but the point
remains that these instructions are primarily liturgical, and other matters are placed into a liturgical
context with liturgical implications. cf John W. Kleinig, Leviticus (St Louis: Concordia, 2003), 22.
11
For example Ps 19, 119.
12
1 Tm 6:20, 2 Tm 1:14.
13
1 Tm 1:13.
14
cf 1 Cor 11:2, 15:3, Gal 1:12, Eph 4:20.
15
Adv. haer., I.10.1-2 in Alexander Roberts & James Donaldson, Eds. Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. 1 (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 330-331. ―The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to
the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith ... she proclaims them,
and teaches them, and hands them down, with perfect harmony, as if she possessed only one mouth. ...
Nor will any one of the rulers in the Churches, however highly gifted he may be in point of eloquence,
teach doctrines different from these.‖ cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 21. ―Irenaeus is
particularly concerned to defend faith in the objective sense as the heritage received the apostles whose
writings are ―the ground and pillar‖ of our faith.‖ (citing 1 Tm 3:15).

8 July 2010

Page 4

St Thomas seems to support this model of faith in defining faith as ―to think with
assent‖ to proposed truth.16 Although the believer cannot truly assent to propositions he
has not yet heard or understood, he is ―bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is
clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.‖17 Following St Thomas,
John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) insisted that truth must be expressed in rational
propositions in order for reason to grasp it, even if supernatural faith infallibly
guarantees it.18 Centuries later, the sixth canon of the Council of Trent incorporated the
Scotist theme that faith is assent to revealed truth.19

Standing astride the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as both the climax of
rationalism and yet ―curiously modern,‖20 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) believed faith
could be described in rational terms,21 treating ‗faith‘ as assent to certain propositions

16

T.C. O‘Brien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31 (New York, Cambridge Press, 2006) ST
II.II, 2.2, Art.1.
17
O‘Brien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae ST II.II, 2.2, Art.5. ―Therefore, as regards the
primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to
believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then
alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the
doctrine of faith.‖
18
Richard Cross, Great Medieval Thinkers – Duns Scotus (New York, Oxford University Press, 1999),
13. ―The correct way of trying to understand revealed truth, for Scotus, necessarily involves a defense of
what we would call the philosophical coherence of such truth. Theology, for Scotus, is a deeply rational
exercise.‖
19
The Council of Trent Decree concerning Justification Ch.VI ―they are disposed to that justice when,
aroused and aided by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are moved freely toward God,
believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised.‖
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html (accessed 13, April 2010).
20
Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Intervarsity, 1968), 91.
21
―In [Religion within Limits of Reason (1793)], conscientiousness and true respect for the Christian
religion but also the principle of proper freedom of thought have led me to conceal nothing. On the
contrary, I have presented everything openly, as I believe I see the possible union of the latter with the
purest possible reason.‖ Letter dated 4 May 1793 (Gesammelte Schriften, XI, p. 429, No.574) cited in
Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 92.
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based on various kinds of evidence. 22 Kant believed that assent to some truth is a ―moral
necessity.‖ He proposed that it would be absurd to believe there are absolute moral
principles without ever being able to hope for them to become a total reality. He insisted
that a rational world is a completely moral world.23 Given that morality fails to be lived
perfectly in this existence he proposed that it is necessary to believe in a future existence
where morality is perfected and justice enacted, or the universe would not be rational. In
short, he argues for the existence of God and an afterlife on the basis of what ought to
be.24 Treating faith as purely rational, Kant displays great optimism in the power of
reason, indeed, he places his religious hope in it.25

The First Vatican Council insisted that faith is assent to truth, which the authority of
God guarantees. 26 The Council assumes that grace is at work in all levels of faith but
insists that ―all things are to be believed which are contained in the Word of God as

22

Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 70-71. ―Kant describes 3 levels of faith, 1) an educated
guess, such as a doctor‘s diagnosis based on an educated assessment of a patient‘s symptoms, but by no
means the only possible reasonable conclusion 2) a persuasive argument, whereby we are convinced by
overwhelming, though still not infallibly certain, evidence and 3) a moral necessity.‖
23
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 808: cited in Paul Guyer, Kant, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2008), 231. ―I
call the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all the moral laws (as it can be in accordance
with the freedom of rational beings and should be in accordance with the necessary laws of morality) a
moral world... an intelligible world.‖
24
Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, (London, Routledge, 1999), 315. ―We would
be entitled to base belief in God‘s existence on what ought to be – on the existence of obligation – rather
than on what is.‖
25
Marilyn McCord Adams believes that Pope John Paul II exceeds Kant‘s optimism about internal
certainty in claiming that certainty about some external questions is a condition of a successful search for
meaning of life. cf. McCord Adams, Marilyn, ―Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in
Anthony Fisher & Hayden Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?
(Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 11.
26
Berard Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology (New London: TwentyThird Publications, 2007), 32-33. ―The Constitution Dei Filius ... presents revelation primarily as the
communication of supernatural truth inaccessible to natural reason, and faith as the acceptance of revealed
truth.‖
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found in Scripture and Tradition, and which are proposed by the Church.‖27 For the First
Vatican Council the object of faith is the revealed truth of God in the Scriptures and in
Tradition (mediated with certainty by the Church). Faith is a form of knowledge based
on divine authority (although the First Vatican Council did not deny faith has other
aspects). While Vatican I emphasises the reasonableness of faith, it rejected blind
‗decisionism‘ by an appeal to the public character of revelation and faith.

In a motu proprio (Sept 1, 1910), Pius X issued his ‗oath against modernism‘.
According to the motu proprio, God can be known by natural reason and evidence. The
Church was founded by the real, revealed and historical Christ; dogmas do not ‗evolve‘
into something other than what the Church initially held. Faith, according to the motu
proprio is intellectual assent to truth which is external to us. This truth is accepted as
true on the basis of God‘s authority.28

More recently, thinkers such as Germain Grisez, one of the most significant contributors
to modern moral thought,29 seem to promote a propositional model of faith. In

27

First Vatican Council ―Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith‖, Session 3, Canon 8. Also relevant
is Session 3, Canon 3. ―With the grace of God inspiring us and assisting us we believe to be true what he
has revealed.
28
Pius X, Motu propriu (Sept 1, 1910) “Oath against Modernism.” ―Faith is not a blind sentiment of
religion welling up from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and pressure of the
informed will, but is a genuinely intellectual assent to truth received from outside by hearing, whereby we
accept as true, on the authority of God who is supremely truthful, that which has been said, attested and
revealed by the personal God, our Creator and Lord.‖
29
Janet E. Smith, Humanae Vitae - A Generation Later (USA, Catholic University of America, 1991),
340.
―The work in ethics of Germain Grisez and his associates, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and William May,
especially their critique of consequentialism and proportionalism, has made an enormous contribution to
contemporary Catholic moral thought.‖
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opposition to writers such as Rahner, O‘Collins, McBrien and Schillebeeckx, Grisez
insists on adherence to the Church‘s propositions in matters of moral life.30

It is worth noting that some recent evangelical Protestant theologians seem to support a
propositional model of faith. Gordon H Clark defines faith as assent to propositions31
and his colleague Carl Henry warns that, without assent to propositions faith is no
longer ―identifiably Christian.‖32

Preliminary thoughts on the Propositional Model
The basic concepts of human communication, understanding propositions, and
comprehending and assessing the reliability of their source, all require the basic skills
which belong to the realm of reason. I cannot begin to believe, for example, the
proposition that ―blue Wednesdays fly twelve‖. No matter what my assessment of the
reliability of the source of such an utterance, the sentence is impossible to believe until
the words are defined in such a way that I could comprehend what was proposed by it.
The sentence must be logical. It must propose something that is comprehensible in order
for anyone to believe it. The exercise of hearing and analysing the sentence is a rational
process.
30

Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol I Ch.1.Q.C, 4. ―All faithful Christians are forbidden to
defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions that are known to be opposed to the doctrine of
faith, … The phrase ―doctrine of faith‖ used here must not be limited to truths solemnly defined. It also
includes at least those truths of faith and morals proposed by the ordinary and universal magisterium of
the Church as truths to be held definitively.‖
31
Gordon, H. Clark, Atheism ―The Trinity Review‖, July/August, 1983, 5. ―There is a definite reason why
not everything can be deduced. If one tried to prove the axioms of geometry, one must refer back to prior
propositions. If these too must be deduced, there must be previous propositions, and so on back ad
infinitum. From which it follows: If everything must be demonstrated, nothing can be demonstrated, for
there would be no starting point. If you cannot start, then you surely cannot finish‖ cf. Dulles, The
Assurance of Things Hoped For, 171. ―Faith, by definition, is assent to understood propositions.‖
32
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 171. ―Faith divorced from assent to propositions ... [is]
neither identifiably Christian nor akin to authentic belief.‖
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Assent to the propositions engages the mind in an act of will and intellect. Even further,
offering a defence (apologetic) of the proposition engages the powers of reason built on
the foundation of revelation.

Dulles raises the problem that this model seems to restrict belief to that which has been
proposed. That is, if we insist that a concept cannot be believed if it cannot be
formulated in a sentence, then we eliminate the possibility of belief in parts of the
‗mystery‘ which have not yet been clearly expressed in propositions.33 Dulles cites the
adage ―we know more than we can say‖ to illustrate his point that this model seems to
overlook ―the mystical dimensions of human knowledge.‖34 It is hard, however, to
imagine we could believe X, even if X were ‗revealed‘ in a mystical manner, if X were
not in some way proposed rationally. The ―mystical‖ source of such a proposition would
not alter the need to comprehend the proposition in order to assent to it. Even if the
mystical source alluded to knowledge unable to be proposed, this would not indicate that
it is possible to believe X without X being proposed for belief. If the mystical source
somehow inspired belief in something without specifically proposing anything, then it
seems that the proposition proposed for belief is that there is something worth believing
which has not (yet) been explicitly proposed, which is in itself a proposition.

It would seem that sentences or propositions describe reality, and that this reality is the
object of belief rather than the sentences themselves. Specifically, the real object of

33

Also relevant is Henri DeLubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 228. ―Faith,
if it be really faith, is always one, always entire. It envelops the totality of its object – even in those parts
of it which have not yet been made plain, or in those aspects which have not yet been explored.‖
34
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 172.

8 July 2010

Page 9

belief is a person, the first and ultimate Truth, and not a proposition. To believe is to
assent that X is the case, which presupposes that X must first be expressed in the form of
a rational proposition. But the believer assents to the reality of X and not merely the
proposition that X is the case.

Although propositions describe reality, they necessarily do so within the limits of
language. The use of language carries with it all the limitations of language. Language
assumes the cultural understanding and philosophical assumptions of that language. It is
one thing to insist a dogmatic formula composed with the language of the sixteenth
century, using language filled with the cultural and philosophical assumptions of the
sixteenth century and which sought to respond to specific issues arising in that same
century has been protected from formal error by the charism of infallibility. It is quite
another thing to insist that this formula has expressed the truth perfectly and completely
for all people, for all time.35 There is a danger in a system that demands such precision
of belief of what Ralph McInerny calls ―philosophical pride.‖36 While absolutising one‘s
own ideas may produce legitimate systems of thought, McInerny suggests that a proper
approach to philosophy takes into account the inherent weaknesses in all systems.37 This
recognition allows for a legitimate plurality of thought systems. Not in suggesting that

35

cf. F&R, 84 and 94.
Ralph McInerney, ―The Scandal of Philosophy: Reconciling Different Philosophical Systems
According to Fides et Ratio‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New
Millennium?, 28.
37
Ralph McInerny, ―The Scandal of Philosophy: Reconciling Different Philosophical Systems According
to Fides et Ratio‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 28.
―Pluralism is legitimate so long as it recognises the partial and imperfect nature of each of the systems
with respect to the truth.‖ (McInerny still insists (ibid, 30) that faith provides a ―negative criterion‖ for
philosophy.)
36
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mutually contradictory systems should be considered ‗true‘ at the same time, but by
acknowledging that both systems are partial and imperfect representations of reality.38

Finally, it is worth noting Swinburne‘s point that our reasons for holding a proposition
may change over time, while we still hold to the same proposition. We may, says
Swinburn, hold a proposition to be true on the basis of our research, and later hold the
same proposition to be true on the basis of having faith in the conclusions of this
research long after forgetting almost all of the relevant details.39 To push Swinburne‘s
example further, we could hold a proposition to be true simply because it presents the
only logical answer to a question, but later, when we are exposed to evidence supporting
the proposition our reasons may change even if the proposition we believe in does not.40

The Propositional Model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
Even in the opening paragraphs of Fides et Ratio we can discern a particular concern for
and emphasis on specific truth located in formal revelation as the proper object of faith.

38

McInerny notes (ibid, 29) that John Paul II‘s insistence that philosophy begins with sense perception
and experience necessarily excludes the philosophy of Descartes at the very least, adding a touch of the
ironic to the irenic approach of the encyclical.
39
Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition, 21-22. ―A person may continue to believe a proposition
while his evidence for it changes. I may a few years ago have assembled a lot of historical evidence
which, I believed, made it probable that Jesus was raised physically from the dead. I therefore believed the
latter proposition. I may now have forgotten the historical evidence, and yet continue to believe that Jesus
was raised. My evidence now may be only that I once did, honestly and conscientiously, examine
historical evidence and reach the conclusion that Jesus was raised. This evidence about my past
investigation may be my present grounds for belief.‖
40
St Thomas Aquinas insists that believing something to be true on the basis we have evidence for it is
not properly faith. (2a.2ae,1.4) Obrien, St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae Vol.31, 21-23.
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The Church ... received the gift of the ultimate truth about human
life. ... It is her duty to serve humanity in different ways, but one way
in particular imposes a responsibility of a quite special kind: the
diakonia of the truth.41
It describes the bishops of the Church as the ones ―who share the mission of
“proclaiming the truth openly” (2 Cor 4:2)”. It points to the bishops as “witnesses of the
divine and Catholic truth” especially for the benefit of the young who, without such
guidance, have “no valid points of reference.”42

The Church can declare herself as bearer of the message43 which God himself has
revealed because God not only desires to make himself known, but provides sufficient
revelation to enable us to understand and believe in Him. The God who cannot deceive
us, nor desires to44, has entrusted revealed truths to his entire people but charged the
Magisterium with the task of providing authoritative boundaries within which the
faithful can go about interpreting this revelation. John Paul II seems to support the idea
that God has revealed himself in the form of propositions when he reiterates the canons
of the First Vatican Council, ―there are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God
which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known.”45

The conviction that faith is grounded in propositions has its origin in the very sentences
of Scripture which propose things for us to believe. Indicating that the authors “intended

41

F&R, 2.
F&R, 6. Also relevant is F&R, 22 ―If something is true, then it must be true for all people and at all
times.‖
43
F&R, 7.
44
F&R, 8.
45
F&R, 9 citing Dei Filius, IV DS 3015.
42
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to formulate true statements, capable ... of expressing objective reality”46 Fides et Ratio
can confidently assert that “faith clearly presupposes that human language is capable of
expressing divine and transcendent reality in a universal way... otherwise there would be
no Revelation of God.”47

This is not to suggest that any human language is capable of expressing the entirety of
divine truth. The document compares the condescension of the second Person of the
Trinity becoming incarnate with the condescension of God expressing at least a portion
of his infinite truth within the mundane boundaries of human language.48 Within the
boundaries of this human language a theologian seeks to understand the meaning of
what is proposed for his belief.49

Although acknowledging that human language and even our reason are retarded by sin,
imperfections and prejudices, Fides et Ratio still confidently asserts that human
language is capable of expressing “unchanging and ultimate truth”50 even surpassing the
usual limits of language.51 Fides et Ratio warns against “abandonment of the traditional
terminology”52 on the basis that the dogmatic propositions of the Church are not merely

46

F&R, 82.
F&R, 84.
48
F&R, 94. ―Human language thus embodies the language of God, who communicates his own truth with
that wonderful ―condescension‖ which mirrors the logic of the Incarnation.‖
49
F&R, 94. ―In interpreting the sources of Revelation, then, the theologian needs to ask what is the deep
and authentic truth which the texts wish to communicate, even within the limits of language.‖
50
F&R, 95.
51
F&R, 95. ―Human language may be conditioned by history and constricted in other ways, but the
human being can still express truths which surpass the phenomenon of language.‖
52
F&R, 55. (In Raimond Gaita, ―Moral Inquiry in a Catholic University‖ in Anthony Fisher & Hayden
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 98.
Gaita opines that ―the longstanding traditions of Catholic moral philosophy, do not ... constitute a
discipline‖ in themselves, but he acknowledge certain characteristics of a Catholic philosopher which
separates them from a non-Catholic philosopher.)
47

8 July 2010

Page 13

human attempts to express the divine reality, but genuine expressions of the divine truth
in human forms. The attempt to express religious truth necessarily draws on philosophy,
even transforming philosophy as it makes use of it53 to propose the revealed truth with
ever increasing clarity “in order to express the true doctrine about God.”54

Against the relativists of various kinds, Fides et Ratio asserts that the truth
communicated in divine revelation is not confined to a particular culture, place or time
so that all men and women find in it the ultimate truth and meaning of their lives.55
Going further, the author insists that man cannot discern grave matters such as what is
―good and evil‖ alone but is ―constrained to appeal to a higher source.‖56 Although
conceding a limited value in various imperfect means of searching for truth the
document insists that ―since Christian truth has a salvific value, any one of these paths
may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus
Christ.‖57

In addition to the use of philosophy to comprehend and utilise ―the various forms and
functions of language‖ in order to facilitate the clear communication of the truth58,
reason comes strongly into play in comprehending, interpreting and communicating the
divinely revealed propositions, not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure
of the propositions in which the Church's teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily,
53

F&R, 39.
F&R, 39.
55
F&R, 12.
56
F&R, 22.
57
F&R, 38.
58
F&R, 65. ―Philosophy [prepares] for a correct auditus fidei with its study of the structure of knowledge
and personal communication, especially the various forms and functions of language.‖
54
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in bringing to light the salvific meaning of these propositions for the individual and for
humanity.59

Far from rendering propositions useless, the doubt that sin creates is the reason for
reliance on rigorous use of philosophical method in careful interpretation of the
propositions of revelation. Faith liberates reason from its limitations60 and it is from our
understanding of ―the sum of these propositions‖ that we come to know the truth.61

The task of the theologian, according to this model of faith, is to utilise philosophical
insight and method to comprehend, develop and communicate ―this certain and
unchangeable doctrine” to each age, in response to the various challenges and needs of
the people of God.62

Negative
It would seem that Fides et Ratio does not so much suggest that the propositional model
of faith is incorrect so much as it is limited. While it is true that God reveals himself
through definitive statements and specific dogmatic formulations, these sentences
present the object of faith to us in human phrases, but the object of faith is properly God.
Fides et Ratio insists that ―only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery
of man take on light.‖63 The object of our faith is not sentences but a person. Even

59

F&R, 66.
F&R, 43. ―Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the
disobedience of sin and finds the strength necessary to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God.‖
61
F&R, 66.
62
F&R, 92.
63
F&R, 12. (citing Gaudium et Spes, 22).
60
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sentences of divine revelation itself are the ―Word made flesh‖64 who reveals himself
and, in doing so, the entire Godhead. Placing faith in mere propositions could carry even
more danger than merely falling short of understanding and knowing God. To be sure,
believing in a person involves believing what that person reveals about themselves. This
model points beyond the propositions themselves to the truth which they express, and
always looks to that ever reliable truth to confirm and increase our understanding of
what has been revealed. Lacking the guidance, respect and proper love of the person
who is the object of faith could lead to a distorted understanding of God, as the failings
of human reason can obscure even revealed truth.65 This is not to suggest that
proponents of the propositional model reject the work of the Holy Spirit or the person of
Christ. Nevertheless it is worth noting that, in their emphasis on the propositions
themselves, there is a danger of placing insufficient emphasis on God as the object of
true faith and on the person of Jesus Christ as the living Word of God, the Word made
flesh. The proper object of faith is God himself, not primarily the propositions which
lead us to and proclaim this object.

Another issue raised by Fides et Ratio which presents a problem for the propositional
model is that of our flawed nature. By virtue of our fallen nature, our reason is not
perfect66, our motives not always reliable and the philosophy we utilise in our struggle
to express the truth can itself be seriously flawed.67 Further still, the very formulations

64

F&R, 7 (citing Dei Verbum, 2).
F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconsistency of the heart often obscure and distort a
person‘s search.‖
66
F&R, 75. ―[Philosophy is] seriously handicapped by the inherent weakness of human reason.‖
67
F&R, 49. ―History shows that philosophy ... has taken wrong turns and fallen into error.‖
65
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are affected by our human limitations.68 On top of all this, we may even flee from the
revealed truth because we are “afraid of its demands.”69
It is here that every attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to
purely human logic is doomed to failure. “Where is the one who is
wise? Where is the learned? Where is the debater of this age? Has
not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” (1 Cor 1:20)70

Conclusion to the Propositional Model
We have seen that the propositional model, properly understood, does not suggest we
believe in propositions but, rather, that propositions are the believers‘ efforts to
coherently describe the mysteries of God. The proponents of the propositional model,
supported by Fides et Ratio, argue that, despite the various difficulties faced by reason,
it is still possible for reason to discover, discern and describe truth. We have seen that it
is impossible to believe something if we do not understand what is to be believed. Even
if God has revealed some truth directly to us, we must use reason to decipher its
meaning in order to assent to it. To ‗think with assent‘, the Christian person needs
reason to deduce how particular propositions coherently interrelate with other
propositions of faith. In fact, it is only through the logical structures of human language
that the believer is able to express truths about God and seek to ‗believe‘ in any
meaningful sense. Uncertainty, difficulty and doubt do not deter proponents of this
model from their optimism regarding reason. They are, rather, spurred on to more
diligent and rigorous application of reason in their search for truth.

68

F&R, 51. ―it is necessary to keep in mind the unity of truth, even if its formulations are shaped by
history and produced by human reason wounded and weakened by sin.‖
69
F&R, 28.
70
F&R, 23.
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The Transcendental Model
The second model of faith described by Avery Dulles is based on the emphasis on
supernatural faith as necessary for supernatural understanding. Faith is not so much
adherence to dogmatic propositions but a gift of transformation, given and freely
accepted, which enlightens and moves the human spirit towards God. This gift is a
totally new perspective, allowing man to reach and understand things far above his
natural reason. Although Dulles attributes this view almost exclusively to Rahner and
his 20th century contemporaries,71 it could be argued that some of its foundational ideas
can be traced back to the Scriptures, even if these were only developed to the present
extent relatively recently.

A strong theme in Biblical wisdom literature, specifically, ―the fear of the Lord is the
beginning of wisdom‖72 and related sentiments,73 directly links human wisdom with a
proper attitude of awe and respect for God‘s majesty. In the New Testament, St Paul
urges his readers to be transformed by a renewal of their mind74 which he describes as
uniting with the mind of Christ.75 It could be argued that the Scriptures support the idea
that a general disposition inclined toward the divine naturally inclines us to greater
understanding.76 A particular attitude or state of mind is necessary for obtaining
wisdom.

71

Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173.
e.g. Ps 111:10, Pr 1:7, 9:10.
73
e.g. Pr 15:33 ―The fear of the Lord teaches a man‖, 16:6 ―through fear of the Lord a man avoids evil.‖
74
Rom 12:2.
75
Php 2:5.
76
cf. The call of wisdom in Pr 1:20-33, 3:13-20, 8:1-36 & 9:1-12.
72
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As early as the first century of Christian history, Pope Clement I, in his lectures to
catechumens, teaches that faith opens the eyes of our hearts to the truth of God.77 St
Cyril of Jerusalem (315-386) held that our reason is ‗enlightened‘ by faith conferred in
baptism78 and St Augustine (354-430) famously proposed that ―unless you believe you
will not understand.‖79 Augustine believes that some truths of the faith are impossible to
understand without the gift of faith.80

Perhaps the most significant contributor to the development of the relationship between
faith and reason, St Thomas Aquinas, referred to a lumen fides, that is, a ―light of faith‖
which enlightens our natural reason and orders the believer towards the things of God.81
Far from claiming that this is an achievement of our natural reason alone, Thomas
insists that the light is Christ himself, who enlightens us and inclines us towards the
good.82 Centuries later saw something of a revival of St Thomas‘s view in Pierre
Rousselot (1878-1915) who described faith as an active power of discernment given to
the mind. Rousselot developed the Thomistic theme of faith as a living connaturality
with the things of God83 by describing the intellect in terms of its final goal, God.84 Karl

77

Clement I First letter to the Corinthians, 36. ―By [Christ] the eyes of hearts are opened. By Him our
foolish and darkened understanding blossoms up anew towards his marvellous light.‖ in Cyril Richardson,
Library of Christian Classics, Vol I – Early Christian Fathers, (London, SCM, 1953).
78
Phillip Schaff, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series II, Vol 11 - Lectures on the Article ―and on one
Holy Ghost, the comforter, which spak by the prophets‖ Lecture XVI, 16 and lecture XVII, 36.
79
Ep 70:1:3-4 ―Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis‖ seems to be a Latin translation of Is 7:9 (from LXX)
according to Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27.
80
Augustine also refers to Is 7:9 ―unless you believe you shall not understand‖ (from LXX) in his
commentary In Psalm., 118; Serm., 18:3 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27.
81
2a.2ae.1.4. Ad3 ―The light of faith does make one see the things believed in.‖ O‘brien, St Thomas
Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31 (Also relevant is 2a.2ae,1.5. Ad1; and 2a.2ae.2.3 Ad2).
82
Thomas Aquinas, The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas: Electronic edition. (InteLex
Corporation, 1993), p71. Commenting on John 1:9 ―He [the Word] was the true light, which enlightens
every man coming into this world.‖)
83
Avery Dulles, introducing Pierre Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith: With Rousselot's Answer to Two Attacks
(New York, Fordham, 1990), 17. ―By defining the intellect in terms of its final object, God, Rousselot
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Adam (1876-1966) continued to build on Aquinas‘ idea, describing faith as a light
which illuminates the intellect and opens it to what is divine and holy. The assent of
faith is affected by the will when it recognises in Christ the summum bonum which is the
fulfilment of the entire person. Adam proposes that the inquirer must abandon the
objective, impersonal, scientific approach and be reverently attentive to a message that
involves the entire person since Christ is not a mere set of proposals but a living person
who communicates himself through the life of the Church. This seems to represent a
departure from St Thomas in that Thomas insisted that the light of faith orders one
towards the articles of faith, and is not indifferent to them.85 St Edith Stein (18911942AD) provides a healthy clarification to this theme, insisting that the light of faith
makes us less vulnerable to error, but not completely preserved from making mistakes.86

In his Introduction to Theology Abelard (1079-1142AD) taught that reason can achieve
a kind of ‗primordial faith‘87 which, while not able to gain us salvation, predisposes us
towards the divine gift of supernatural faith which saves. John Duns Scotus further
developed the idea that human reason needs healing after the fall but that, when healed
by faith, human reason resumes its search for understanding which is proper to its

recalled St Thomas‘ paradoxical doctrine about the ―natural desire for the beatific vision.‖ For no concept,
only God known in Himself, can satisfy the soul‘s innate longing for the truth‖ (cf. Dulles, The Assurance
of Things Hoped For, 111. ―For Rousselot the light of faith is something by which we see, not something
seen.‖)
84
Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith: With Rousselot's Answer to Two Attacks, 17. ―Rousselot conceived
knowledge as a tendency towards its goal and effectively rendered man connatural with that goal,
specifically the First Truth, God Himself, and with all that led to this goal.‖
85
II.II.2.3 Reply Ob.2 ―anyone, through the light of faith divinely infused, gives assent to what is of faith
and not the opposite.‖ Obrien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31, 75.
86
Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Assent to the Meaning of Being (Washington
DC: ICS Publications, 2002), 21 in Prudence Allen, Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers, 52.
87
Introductio ad theologiam, Bk. II sec. 3; PL 178:1051 ―primordia fidei‖ in Dulles, The Assurance of
Things Hoped For, 29.
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created nature.88 According to Scotus, our search for God and faith in Him is not
something artificially imposed on us via an external faith but a natural end of our
created being.

Jacobus Payva d‘Andrada, a Portuguese Jesuit, proposed a kind of ‗salvation of the
Greeks‘, the idea that Aristotle is in heaven by virtue of his‗natural faith‘ and implicit
desire for union with the one God. Responding to suggestions that anyone who never
knew Christ would be consigned to hell, he wrote ―There can be no more shocking
harshness and cruelty than to deliver up human beings to everlasting torments on
account of lack of faith which they could in no way obtain.‖89 Juan De Lugo (15831660) and others argued more carefully, suggesting that a pagan might come to receive
supernatural grace which allows them to assent to certain parts of the truth (available to
them in their pagan religion or in nature) but that they would still need to make an ‗act
of faith‘ in a saving God.90

Although Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and his intellectual followers tend
to fall more into Dulles‘s affective/experiential model than the transcendental model, his
insistence that dependence on the transcendent is more significant than revealed
propositions could be seen as a key building block for those who later developed the
transcendental model of faith as Dulles describes it. Schleiermacher described faith as
88

Cross, Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus, 11. ―Scotus‘ answer to the first question [Do we need
revealed doctrine in order to be saved?] is a resounding ―No.‖ He reasons that it would be possible for
God to save someone without the gift of faith, and a fortiori without any theological knowledge.‖ cf.
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 36-37.
89
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 59 citing d‘Andrada‘s Orthodoxarum explicationum ...
libri decem from Martin Chemnitz‘s Examination of the Council of Trent, Sixth Topic, sec. 1, no. 7;
1:393.
90
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 60.
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―the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being
in relation with God.‖91 For Schleiermacher, faith consists of the experience itself, and
this experience becomes a testimony when shared.92

Drawing on many of the themes above, Karl Rahner (1904-1984) interpreted the ‗light
of faith‘ not so much as revelation of dogmatic truth,93 but as God‘s gracious gift of
himself,94 which invites and enables human beings to say ―yes‖ to the transcendent
which is called ‗God‘.95 Human faith is, in turn, a complete self giving over to the
transcendent mystery which we call ‗God‘, following the example of Christ himself who
gave himself over to God completely. Faith, in this model, does not mean Jesus, or
anyone else, believes in statements of fact, but that the entire self is given over to the
transcendent.96 This intimacy with the divine person does not, according to Rahner,
lessen the mystery of God. In fact human language struggles to express the mystery of

91

H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart Eds. Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith (London,
T&T Clark, 1948), 16. ―The self-identical essence of piety, is this : the consciousness of being absolutely
dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.‖
92
Mackintosh & Stewart Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 11. ―Piety in its diverse expressions
remains essentially a state of feeling.‖ And p12 ―The self-identical essence of piety, is this : the
consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.‖
93
Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: Crossroad, 2004), 116. ―We want to avoid
both misunderstandings that a mere word about God, although perhaps spoken by God, as well as that of
self-communication of God which is refined and understood entirely after the manner of a thing.‖
94
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 118. ―God‘s self-communication means, therefore, that what
is communicated is really God in his own being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of
knowing and possessing God in immediate vision and love.‖
95
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 101. Rahner believes we are also free to say no to God, but
that this ―no‖ must be to God himself, ―not merely to some distorted or childish notion of God‖ nor to
God‘s law, nor ―merely the moral sum which we calculate from good or evil deeds.‖ For Rahner‘s
discussion of the freedom of this choice see Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 97-106.
96
John J O‘Donnell SJ., Karl Rahner - Life in the Spirit (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2004), 53.
―In Rahner‘s mind Christ‘s surrender to God in freedom reveals him as a man of faith and hope. For
Rahner, Christ is not dispensed from faith, rather he is the perfect exemplification of it. But faith here is
understood not so much as believing that something is the case, but rather as surrender to God. And
Christ, like us, does so in darkness, indeed even the bitter darkness of the abandonment of the cross.‖
[expounding Theological Investigations XIII (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), 165].
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God.97 This transcendent God is the ultimate goal towards whom the human spirit is
oriented, the only goal that can satisfy us and complete us.98 God commits himself to
grant the necessary grace to enable us to rise to the goal.99 God‘s offer of this grace is, at
least implicitly, in the created world, and created beings.100

This transcendental faith is possible, according to Rahner, without explicitly assenting to
dogmatic formulas regarding Christ.101 A basic acceptance of the holy mystery is
enough for faith, even without any understanding or formulation of doctrine or even, in
some cases, in the absence of what might be considered vital doctrines. 102 This form of
‗faith‘ produces the possibility of an ‗anonymous Christian‘.103 For Rahner, ―faith is an

97

Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. ―Divine closeness
notwithstanding, God remains the incomprehensible mystery that brings language to breaking point.‖
98
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 83. ―The most radial and absolutely immediate selfcommunication of God in his very own being is given to us, ... the finite subject does not disappear in this
most immediate manifestation of God and it is not suppressed, but rather it reaches its fulfilment and
hence its fullest autonomy as subject. This autonomy is at once both the presupposition and the
consequence of this absolute immediacy to God and from God.‖
99
Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. ―Grace is God‘s
transforming presence enabling divinization of humans and their participation in the divine life.‖
100
Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45. ―For Rahner, grace and
nature, the divine self-gift and humans and their world, are related as the contingently-is and the
hypothetically-necessary. Nature must be if divine self-giving is to have an addressee. Creation is
grounded in God‘s gracing love. Nature exists for grace, never apart from grace. The incarnation is the
goal of creation‘s movement, the conditions of its possibility.‖
101
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 227. ―We can say then: anyone who accepts Jesus as the
ultimate truth of his life and professes that God has spoken the ultimate word to him in Jesus and in his
death, not all the penultimate words which we still have to find ourselves in our own history, but the
ultimate word for which he lives and dies, he thereby accepts Jesus as the Son of God as the church
professes him to be. This is true whatever the theoretically inadequate or even false conceptualisation
might sound like in his own formulation of the faith in which he is living out his existence.‖
102
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 228. ―Anyone who, though still far from any revelation
explicitly formulated in words, accepts his existence in patient silence (or, better, in faith, hope and love),
accepts it as the mystery which lies hidden in the mystery of eternal love and which bears life in the womb
of death, is saying ―yes‖ to Christ even though he does not know it.‖
103
cf. Donovan, Daniel, ―Revelation and faith‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 93-94.
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acceptance of the nearness of God as absolute mystery.‖104 Faith can even exist in
atheists who ―accept themselves unconditionally.‖105 This faith does incline one to
assent to revelation when it is credibly proclaimed, but can exist in persons even if they
have never previously encountered any specific revelation.

Preliminary thoughts on the Transcendental Model
This model seems once again to possess an optimism about reason, albeit reason assisted
and mediated by divine grace. It also focuses the search for truth and meaning firmly on
the transcendent divine. While naming the transcendent truth as its object, however, the
model seems to allow the possibility of an imprecise and unguided search for truth, even
if it does not adopt it completely. Perhaps the model finds support in the dichotomy,
such as presented by Marilyn McCord Adams, between a realism concerning reality but
not concerning epistemology.106 The transcendental model seems to be promoting a
search for truth which is optimistic about finding truth and yet pessimistic about being
certain when one has found the truth. A proponent of this model sets out with all the joy
of a child on an Easter egg hunt but with no idea how to tell the eggs from rocks, or
104

Karl Rahner, ―Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today,‖ Theological Investigations, vol5 (New
York: Crossroad, 1974), 7 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173.
105
Donovan, ―Revelation and faith‖ in Marmion & Hines, Eds. The Cambridge Companion to Karl
Rahner, 94. ―On a number of occasions Rahner argued that a genuine acceptance of oneself is the
beginning of faith, and it is already an act of saving faith. What is at stake here is not the relatively
superficial self-acceptance of pop-psychology, but rather something that involves the whole person,
including one‘s openness to the infinite and the absolute.‖ cf. Karl Rahner, ―Faith Between Rationality
and Emotion,‖ Theological Investigations, vol.16 (New York: Seabury/Crossroad, 1979),67. ―[Faith] can
be found in people who consciously believe they are and must be atheists, as long as they are completely
obedient to the absolute demands of conscience, that is, ... they accept themselves unconditionally,
without self rejection, fulfilling that primordial capacity of freedom which involves the subject as a
whole.‖ Cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173; on self acceptance as faith see
―Anonymous Christians,‖ Theological Investigations vi, 390-398 and ―Anonymous and Explicit Faith,‖
Theological Investigations xvi, 52-59.
106
Hilary Martin OP, ―Comments on ‗Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in Fisher &
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 21. ―While Adams is a realist
about reality, she is not a realist about human knowledge of that reality.‖
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even, ultimately, if eggs are what he is looking for! Epistemological pessimism
notwithstanding, the absence of an emphasis on dogmatic guidelines leaves the
proponent of this model with reason alone to identify, discern, and critically assess the
raw data of experience in order to determine what, if anything, has transcendent
significance. In other words the proponent of the transcendental model is left with only
their reason to guide their life and belief.

Although this model seems to downplay specific revealed truth, it does not dispense
with reason. Where specific revelation is absent, or not yet presented ‗credibly,‘ the
individual has only reason to guide them in discerning a ‗transcendent‘ reality from
random happenstance. Reason has a place in organising these ideas into a coherent
system which expresses their underlying desire to draw near to the mysterious God and
serves as a guide their daily actions. Hence Gregory Moses can propose that we cannot
insist others believe what we do, since what we believe is only our explanation of what
we believe at present, but we can expect their proposals to be reasonable. Their
conscience almost completely guided by reason, (guided by the ‗light of faith‘),
becomes the norm for their belief and ‗faithfulness‘ of life.107

The scope of reason within this model might include the exercise of discerning who ―I‖
am in order to engage in the fundamental self acceptance, the act of will which engages
my whole person in a fundamental ‗yes‘ to the transcendent, and the practical operation
of the conscience which is the arbiter of all moral action. In this light it would seem that

107

Gregory Moses, ―Faith and Reason – Naturalised and Naturalised‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and
Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 49-52.
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the transcendental model presents an optimistic approach to reason, trusting it
completely. Nevertheless it seems to sacrifice hope in universally accessible objective
truth via revelation in favour of a disproportionate trust in unguided reason, as opposed
to reason assisted by faith and revealed truth. At the very least it moves the focus from
revelation (as it appears in the propositional model) and focuses on the subjective fides
qua aspect of faith.

Even so, the claim that human beings find fulfilment in belief is an audacious claim,
made in the face of modern scepticism and even surprises some self professed realists.
Marilyn McCord Adams believes, for example, that Pope John Paul II goes beyond St
Thomas, even beyond Kant‘s ―moral‖ imperative to claim that God and belief in our
immortality are necessary for a successful search for the meaning of life.108

The Transcendental Model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
Fides et Ratio espouses the foundational principle of the transcendental model of faith
by asserting that faith and reason not only work in cooperation towards the same
ultimate truth109 but that this search begins in the very nature of humankind, knowing
ourselves in all the mystery that entails, and asking the ―fundamental questions which
pervade human life: Who am I, where have I come from and where am I going? Why is

108

Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in, Fisher &
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 11.
109
F&R, introductory paragraph.
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there evil? What is there after this life?”110 These things stem from our common
experience of being human, and the quest for meaning that this entails.

Fides et Ratio uses the ‗wise man‘ of Scripture as the exemplar of man in pursuit of his
own self realisation. Citing the dramatic poetic description of a wise man pursuing
wisdom as a hunter pursues his prey,111 the encyclical lauds the search for truth as
something which defines our very humanity, and sets us apart as creatures destined for
transcendence. Self realisation is the ultimate goal of all human beings in this model.112
Indeed, the very search for truth implies an inbuilt conviction that truth is obtainable.113
This is not to say that we can achieve complete knowledge and salvific self realisation
by purely natural powers. The Holy Spirit provides an utterly transformed way of
looking at the universe and oneself which allows the intellect to rise to the
contemplation of truth114. It is the Holy Spirit at work in all of history, from beginning
to end, that man‘s illuminated reason discovers, discerns and assents to in faith.115 The
truth is available to all in history and ultimately leads anyone with a ―sincere heart‖ to
the ―definitive vision of God.‖116

110

F&R, 1, and 26. ―Truth comes initially ... as a question: Does life have meaning?‖
F&R, 16. “Happy the man who meditates on wisdom and reasons intelligently, who reflects in his heart
on her ways and ponders her secrets. He pursues her like a hunter and lies in wait on her paths. He peers
through her windows and listens at her doors.” (Sir 14:20ff).”
112
F&R, 4. ―Driven by the desire to discover the ultimate truth of existence, human beings seek to acquire
those universal elements of knowledge which enable them to understand themselves better and to advance
in their own self-realization.‖
113
F&R, 29. ―Human beings would not even begin to search for something of which they knew nothing or
for something which they thought was wholly beyond them.”
114
F&R, 16. ―Faith sharpens the inner eye, opening the mind to discover in the flux of events the
workings of Providence.‖ Also relevant are F&R, 41 ―purified and rightly tuned, therefore, reason could
rise to the higher planes of thought‖ and F&R, 43. ―Illuminated by faith, reason is set free... to rise to the
knowledge of the Triune God.‖
115
F&R, 11. Citing Dei Verbum, 8.
116
F&R, 15.
111
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The Thomistic theme of connaturality referred to in Fides et Ratio117 also seems to
support the transcendental model. The light of faith which opens our senses and minds
to the truth of God in history, creation and in our very selves goes further to instil in us a
kind of natural inclination to the truth of God, by virtue of his gracious work of faith
within us. This connaturality seems to be manifest in the encyclical‟s example of the
martyrs. The martyrs‟ witness does not need logical arguments or carefully worded
propositions in order to convince us of the truth their actions bear testimony to since,
“from the moment they speak to us of what we perceive deep down as the truth we have
sought for so long.”118

The focus here is the human being on the path to enlightenment rather than dogmatic
propositions. To propose dogmatic formulae in themselves as the ‗end‘ or object of faith
distracts from the purpose of revelation since, ―the knowledge proper to faith does not
destroy the mystery; it only reveals it the more.”119 Far from ending the search,
revelation, wherever we find it, urges us to search further because “this knowledge
refers back constantly to the mystery of God which the human mind cannot exhaust but
can only receive and embrace in faith.”120

117

F&R, 44. ―This wisdom comes to know by way of connaturality.‖
F&R, 32. Further ―the martyrs stir in us a profound trust because they give voice to what we already
feel and they declare what we would like to have the strength to express.‖
119
F&R, 13.
120
F&R, 15. ―Revelation therefore introduces into our history a universal and ultimate truth which stirs
the human mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually to extend the range of its
knowledge‖ Also relevant is F&R, 38 ―philosophy yearns for the wisdom ... and does all it can to acquire
it.‖
118
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Fides et Ratio seems to support this model in its repeated insistence that “human
knowledge is a journey which allows no rest,”121 urging man on to greater effort to
discover and comprehend it, in fundamental openness to the transcendent God who
“neither deceives nor wishes to deceive.”122 Since the truth is found in the origin of all
truth, it is the primary task of human beings to search for truth, and thus for God. 123 It is
not only revelation itself that spurs us on to discover truth: it is our deepest human desire
to know the truth and embrace it as our own.124 The encyclical echoes the proponents of
a transcendental model of faith in insisting that all knowledge, and even the search for it,
leads us ultimately to the one who is the Truth, the Word made flesh.

Even the concept of an “anonymous Christian”, if seen as a genuine seeker of truth,
seems to find support in the idea that there are many paths to truth but only one final
goal, Jesus Christ.125 It might receive a certain qualified support from the closing
paragraphs where the author declares the Church‟s commitment to genuine dialogue in
truth with all who love the truth excluding neither those who are ignorant of the ultimate
source of truth nor even those who “are hostile to the Church and persecute her in
various ways”.126

121

F&R, 16, 17, 18, 33.
F&R, 8.
123
F&R, 17. ―In God there lies the origin of all things, in him is found the fullness of the mystery, and in
this his glory consists; to men and women there falls the task of exploring truth with their reason, and in
this their nobility consists.”
124
F&R, 24. ―In the far reaches of the human heart there is a seed of desire and nostalgia for God.‖, 25
―all human beings desire to know.‖
125
F&R, 38. ―There are many paths which lead to truth, but since Christian truth has a salvific value, any
one of these paths may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus
Christ”; (Also relevant is 102 ―People today will come to realize that their humanity is all the more
affirmed the more they entrust themselves to the Gospel and open themselves to Christ‖).
126
F&R, 104 (citing Gaudium et Spes, 92).
122
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Fides et Ratio shares the transcendentalist‟s optimism regarding reason. Where the
encyclical acknowledges that reason can mislead it attributes the error to human sin127,
an improperly attuned will,128 rather than to reason. Even admitting that reason is
“limited” the encyclical insists it is possible to know truth by reason.129

Rahner‟s primacy of conscience, essential to a model of faith which plays down the
necessity of authoritative revelation, might perhaps find support in the admonition to
greater use of conscience.130

It is hardly surprising that this shared optimism regarding reason leads to further
agreement in the conclusion that all people should be encouraged to trust and exercise
reason in their ongoing search for truth.131

Negative
While Fides et Ratio does assert that God has placed his truth “in time and history”132
the document is referring to the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the incarnate
Word and second person of the Blessed Trinity. The proponents of the transcendental
model claim that their search for truth has Christ as its end. But, even if the individual is
127

F&R, 17. ―If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not
because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment
in the way.”
128
F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a
person's search.”
129
F&R, 16. ―With the light of reason human beings can know which path to take, but they can follow
that path to its end, quickly and unhindered, only if with a rightly tuned spirit they search for it.”
130
F&R, 68. ―In order to apply these to the particular circumstances of individual and communal life,
Christians must be able fully to engage their conscience and the power of their reason.”
131
F&R, 56. ―Nonetheless, in the light of faith which finds in Jesus Christ this ultimate meaning, I cannot
but encourage philosophers—be they Christian or not—to trust in the power of human reason.”
132
F&R, 11.
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not aware of this at stages of the journey, the specific rejection of dogmatic formulae
seems to be what Fides et Ratio warns against in several places.133 We are further
warned of the disastrous results of any attempt to seek the truth that divorces us from the
sure guiding hand of God‟s self revelation.134 As the encyclical says, our inner conflicts,
concerns and fear of where the truth may lead us can distort our perception of truth.135
In addition to general natural failings of human reason, there is a constant danger
specific to each culture and age which has the potential to lead us astray136. This is why
Fides et Ratio urges us, with the words of Saint Paul to “See to it that no-one takes you
captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition ... and not
according to Christ.”137 The encyclical also provides examples of the early Fathers
struggling against the prevailing errors of their day by clinging to the revealed truth.138

Thus Fides et Ratio urges theologians to remain firmly within their ―ecclesial
context‖139 and submit themselves to the guidance of the Magisterium which responds
with warnings to those who stray from the path to genuine wisdom.140

133

F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the
danger of losing sight of its final goal.” Also relevant are F&R, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12 and 37.
134
F&R, 5. ―sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice.‖, 6, 21, and 75 ―In refusing
the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since this is to preclude access
to a deeper knowledge of truth.”
135
F&R, 28. ―The search for truth, of course, is not always so transparent nor does it always produce such
results. The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a
person's search. Truth can also drown in a welter of other concerns. People can even run from the truth as
soon as they glimpse it because they are afraid of its demands.”
136
F&R, 55. ―This happens when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow
themselves to be swayed uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and
culture but which are poorly grounded in reason.‖
137
F&R, 37 (Col 2:8).
138
F&R, 37 (Saint Irenaeus and Tertullian).
139
F&R, 101.
140
F&R, 49.
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Conclusion to the Transcendental Model
The transcendental model places great importance on reason. Where reason is darkened,
faith provides light. Where it is limited by its natural capacity it is reinvigorated by
supernatural faith. Where supernatural matters seem so far beyond our mundane
existence that they are unnatural to us, faith infuses us with a connaturality with the
things of God. Where a person does not believe, or even explicitly denounces certain
beliefs, this model places great hope in reason leading them to what is their proper
fulfilment in the truth. In placing hope in reason, even assisted reason, to find
transcendent meaning, the proponents of this model assume that both human beings, and
the universe they inhabit, are fundamentally coherent, and coherently point us to truth
that transcends this universe.
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The Fiducial Model
Faith, in the fiducial model, is trusting surrender to God‘s promises to save us. The
model seems to find its beginnings in the Scriptures themselves. The Hebrew and Greek
words translated into English as ‗faith‘ usually include the concept of trustfulness in
their semantic fields. In the case of the Old Testament, the primary meaning of these
words seems to be the trustworthiness of the object of faith rather than a focus on the
belief of the subject. There is no word in Hebrew that directly corresponds to the
modern word ―faith‖.141

The Hebrew word  אמנin its simplest form means to support or sustain.142 The niphal
form, meaning ―to be established as reliable, trustworthy etc‖, is used predominantly of
God.143 In the hiphil form the meaning is primarily ―to stand firm‖, or ―to trust‖ which is
often translated ―to believe.‖144 Where the word is used of people it refers to their trust,
or lack of trust in the faithfulness of God. Another Hebrew word often translated as
―trust‖ is בטח. Almost all the occurrences of this word indicate surety, trust and proper
hope in God or some other trustworthy object. Even the New Testament  should
perhaps be translated as ―trust‖ as much as ―faith.‖145 The majority of Scriptural uses
141

Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 7. (Dulles points out that of the three Hebrew words most
often translated to the Greek  none correspond exactly to the Greek meaning.)
142
William L. Holladay, Ed. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Grand
Rapids, Eerdmans, 1988), 20. This simple meaning only in its Qal passive participle form ―was
sustained.‖ The predominant use is in the niphal and the hiphil.
143
Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance (Peabody, Hendrickson, 1984). Some
exceptions include: Gen 42:20 where Joseph keeps one of his brothers hostage to ensure the ‗faithfulness‘
of the remaining brothers to their agreement. Another example is the reference to God raising up a
‗faithful‘ priest, ‗faithful‘ being defined by the fact he ‗will do what is in [God‘s] heart and mind.‘
144
Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance, 103-104. The semantic field of this word, as it
is used in Scripture, includes ‗faithful/ reliable (58), believe (41), confirmed/true (23), trust (9),
sure/assurance (8), established (8), lasting/enduring (5), nurse (5), guardian (4), firm (4), fulfilled (2),
doorpost (1)‘, and even indicates the ‗steady hand‘ of a skilled sculptor in Song of Songs.
145
Walter Bauer et al, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, 2nd Ed, 662.
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refer to acting with certainty that something is trustworthy and reliable, particularly God
in fulfilling His promises. God knows best and thus we trust Him by doing as He
commands, because we know it is good for us, even if we cannot understand why.

Theologians in the fourth century, including St Augustine, responded to the Pelagian
heresy by emphasising the fallen nature of human reason.146 In his early writings,
Augustine suggests that the mind‘s vision of God is clouded by our immersion in the
material world and confusion of the senses.147 In his Confessions, he speaks of certainty
of mind but blames his own pride and sensuality as distorting factors.148 Later writings
such as City of God speak of faith as a conscious choice to believe the God who
descends into the ‗darkness‘ of the world to reveal himself as light and to rescue us.149
According to Augustine, this darkness serves to protect us from intellectual pride, and to
teach us to rely on God in order to know.150 Faith is essentially an act of obedience to
God‘s word, both moral and intellectual. Later in life, Augustine still insists that faith is

146

Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 23. According to Dulles, Basil the Great (330-379),
Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390) and Gregory of Nyssa (335-394) all emphasised the inability of man‘s
reason to rise to the truth of God, and the necessity of faith in God‘s revelation to grasp the divine truth.
147
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 26.
148
cf. Maria Boulding Tr. The Confessions of St Augustine, 193 (Bk VIII.11). ―I had grown used to
pretending that the only reason why I had not yet turned my back on the world to serve you was that my
perception of the truth was uncertain, but that excuse was no longer available to me, for by now I was
certain. But I was still entangled by the earth and refused to enlist in your service.‖ Dulles (26) claims
Augustine places more emphasis on his own pride than on sensuality in Confessions.
149
Phillip Schaff, Saint Augustine’s City of God and Christian Doctrine (Kessinger, 2004). Dulles refers
to City of God XI, 29 ―For the knowledge of the creature is, in comparison of the knowledge of the
Creator, but a twilight; and so it dawns and breaks into morning when that creature is drawn to the praise
and love of the Creator.‖
150
Phillip Schaff, Saint Augustine’s City of God and Christian Doctrine IX, 537. ―I do not doubt that this
[darkness] was divinely arranged for the purpose of subduing pride by toil, and preventing a feeling of
satiety in the intellect, which generally holds in small esteem what is discovered without difficulty.‖
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a pure gift, freely given by God. Justifying faith comes through hearing Christ and
receiving faith through hearing the incarnate Word.151

The fiducial model seems to find some support in the canons of the Council of Orange
(529AD) itself a response to a development of Pelagius‘ error.152 The Council affirms
that ―the sin of the first man has so impaired and weakened free will that no one
thereafter can either love God as he ought or believe in God or do good for God's sake,
unless the grace of divine mercy has preceded him.‖153 In the era of the Reformation,
when the matter of faith and works was hotly debated, both Catholics and Protestants
affirmed the canons of the Council of Orange regarding faith and works.154

Where scholastics saw faith as an act of the intellect and hope as a function of the will,
Martin Luther (1483-1546) criticised the scholastic tendency to place importance on
reason and ‗works‘ which he called Pelagian.155 Luther referred to an ‗alien
righteousness‘ which is imputed to us by God and which we passively receive.156 God
creates this faith by his Word, which comes to us through proclamation and the
administration of the sacraments. For Luther, faith and reason are in constant conflict.
151

1 Cor 3:7, In Joan. Evang., 26:7 cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27.
Kurt Aland, A History of Christianity Vol.I (Philadelphia: Fortress,1985), 210-211. ―The so-called
Semipelagian controversy ... was fed from two sources: the ascetic and the traditionalist.‖
153
John. H. Leith, Creeds of the Churches (Louisville, John Knox Press, 1982) p43. Concluding
paragraph of the Council of Orange, 529AD (cf Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 28).
154
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 28. ―They were accepted by Catholics and by most
Protestants as valid and decisive.‖
155
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 44. ―[Luther] particularly criticised what he took to be a
Pelagian tendency in Scholasticism to attach too much importance to human reason and human works as
approaches to faith.‖
156
Robert Kolb, ―Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness‖ in Timothy J. Wengert, Harvesting Martin
Luther’s reflections on theology, ethics and the church (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2004), 47-48. ―There
are two kinds of righteousness... the first is alien righteousness, that is, the righteousness of another,
instilled from without. This is the righteousness of Christ by which he justifies through faith.‖ (citing a
sermon given in 1519 by Martin Luther called Two kinds of Righteousness).
152
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Faith endures a constant attack from experience and doubt which is only combated by
faith firmly clinging to God and the believer submitting reason completely to faith. In
fact he describes faith as a sacrifice of reason, saying ―for by this sacrifice they [the
believers] slay reason which is the greatest and most invincible enemy of God.‖ 157

Luther defined two types of faith. First, ‗historic‘ faith, and second, accepting what God
says is true and trusting in God‘s promises. The latter definition is the kind of faith
which alone justifies. This ‗faith alone‘ which saves is complete trust in God‘s promises
in revelation.158 Similarly, John Calvin (1509-1564) defined faith as ―firm knowledge of
God‘s benevolence towards us... both revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts [by
the Holy Spirit.]‖159 This idea of faith is summarised in the words of the (Calvinist)
Second Helvitic Confession;

What is faith? Christian faith is not an opinion or human conviction,
but a most firm trust and clear and steadfast assent of the mind, and
then a most certain apprehension of the truth of God presented in the
Scriptures and in the Apostles‘ Creed, and thus also of God himself,
the greatest good, and especially of God‘s promise and of Christ who
is the fulfilment of all promises.160
Although the Council of Trent specifically rejected a fiducial position,161 it is still
possible to find limited support in later Catholic authors. St John of the Cross (1542-

157

Martin Luther, Commentary on Galatians, 1535; LW 26:229 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things
Hoped For, 45.
158
Theodore G. Tappert, The Book of Concord (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 366. ―To cling to him
with all our heart is nothing else than to enstrust ourselves to him completely.‖ Also relevant are The
Apology to the Augsburg Confession, IV, 41 (Tappert, 113) and 58 (Tappert, 115).
159
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 46.
160
Arthur C. Cochrane, ed. Reformed Confession of the 16th Century, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966),
257 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 52.
161
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 49. Although canon 5 of the Decree on Justification
reflects the Augustinian theme that nothing happens without being moved by God‘s grace, it insists that
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1591) for example, says faith is a means of uniting the intellect with God in this present
life, a kind of dark, illumination162 which does in this life what the vision of God will do
in the next life. In fact, he suggests that as our faith grows it must learn to dispense with
sensory and intellectual evidence. He proposes that faith nullifies the light of the
intellect.163 After something of a conversion experience, the brilliant Blaise Pascal
(1623-1662) literally sewed words into his clothing that God is ―not [the God] of
philosophers and scientists‖ but rather of ―certitude, feeling, joy and peace.‖ Faith, says
Pascal rests on total submission to God‘s authority. 164

Over a century later, the Danish Protestant, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) insisted that
faith was an ―absolute paradox‖ offensive to reason.165 He argued that faith regards
proof as its enemy, seeking no assurance other than itself.166 He nonetheless confesses a
kind of ‗demented‘ admiration for the incomprehensible faith of Abraham.167 Wilhelm

we freely cooperate with grace. Canon six incorporates a Scotist theme that faith is one of a number of
preparatory acts, and that faith is ―assent to the truth of the proclaimed message‖. Faith comes from
hearing, we are led (freely) toward God. We fear hell, love God, hate sin, hope in God, are baptised etc.
162
Kieran Kavanaugh OCD & Otilio Rodriguez OCD Trs. The Collected Works of St John of the Cross
(Washington: ICS, 1979), 111. ―Faith, a dark and obscure cloud to man (also a night in that it blinds and
deprives him of his natural light), illumines and pours light into the darkness of his soul by means of its
own darkness.‖ (Ascent of Mount Carmel Bk II, 3,4).
163
Kavanaugh & Rodriguez Trs. The Collected Works of St John of the Cross, 118. ―For other knowledge
can be acquired by the light, if that light of the understanding, but the knowledge that is of faith is
acquired without the illumination of the understanding, which is rejected for faith.‖ (Bk II, 3).
164
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 63. See also Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy (Chatham: Oxford University Press, 1996), 278 ―Because of his prevailing scepticism,
coupled, however, with a deep faith, Pascal has been compared to Kierkegaard as a leading example of
religious conviction based on an existential commitment to faith rather than on reason.‖
165
Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 48. ―Faith
is this paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in absolute relation to the absolute. This
standpoint cannot be mediated, for all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and
forever remains a paradox, inaccessible to thought.‖
166
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 80; He rejected the theories of Hegel and the (then) rigid
Danish Lutheran Church cf. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 207.
167
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 53. ―Abraham is ... either a murderer or a believer. Abraham lacks
the middle term that saves the tragic hero. That is why I can understand a tragic hero but I cannot
understand Abraham, even though in a certain demented sense I admire him more than all the others.‖
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Herrmann (1846-1922) denounced Catholicism and even the remnants of it in Luther‘s
theology, saying that doctrine is only useful as a preamble to faith as a ―trustful
surrender.‖168

Some Protestant scholars returned to a form of the fiducial model in a theory first
espoused by Jürgen Moltmann (1926- ) in Theology of Hope in 1967 and emerging
from a dialogue with a Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. Moltmann returned to Calvin‘s
idea that hope is inseparable from faith.169 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928- ) suggests that
the record of God‘s action in history reveals God as faith-worthy, but faith is the
surrender of oneself into this same God. He says certainty of faith comes when the
message of God is ―grasped completely.‖170 Moltmann disagreed that history provides a
reliable foundation but agreed that ―faith is called to life by God‘s promise and we hope
in the God who cannot and will not lie.‖171 Moltmann also maintains that this hope does
not preclude thinking. In fact, he says, it is hope that enables and empowers our
thinking.172
168

Willhelm Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God (New York, Williams and Norgate,
1906), 40. ―By this breach from scholasticism, we gain for theology the opposite result from that which
our breaking loose from mysticism brings about for the inner life of the Christian. There is less theology;
there is a richer life within. Our rejection of the practice of Roman Catholicism suggests the true course
for the accomplishment of our task. Our object is to set forth the real communion of the Christian with
God.‖ Cf Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 97.
169
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 161 Citing Jurgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 5th
ed. (1965; ET, Theology of Hope, London: SCM, 1967). ―Faith hopes in order to know what it believes.
Hence all its knowledge will be anticipatory, fragmentary knowledge forming a prelude to a promised
future.‖
170
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man 2nd Edition (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 229.
―Where the message of God‘s nearness is grasped completely and in full trust, salvation itself is already
effective.‖ cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 175. ―The certainty of faith consists in the
completeness of trust.‖ Citing Pannenberg in ―Response to the Discussion‖ in James Robinson, & John
Cobb eds., Theology as History (New York: Harper Row, 1967), 273.
171
Jürgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 5th Ed. (1965; ET, Theology of Hope, London: SCM,
1967), 44.
172
Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 18 ―If it is hope that maintains and upholds faith and keeps it
moving on, if it is hope that draws the believer into the life of love, then it will also be hope that is the
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Also, on the fiducial paradigm, August Sabatier (1839-1901) supported a ―symbolfideism.‖ That is, symbols lead us to the truth but true faith is a deep inner conviction.
Faith is seen as a moral act, a consecration of the self to God, as opposed to a merely
intellectual assent to historical or revealed truths.173 They expressed their justification
formula as ―we are saved by faith, independent of beliefs.‖174

Preliminary Thoughts on the Fiducial Model
The fiducial model seems to present an extremely pessimistic view of reason,
discounting it as a reliable source of truth, discovering truth or even of properly
interpreting truth. This epistemic pessimism is evident in Marilyn McCord Adams‘
commentary on Fides et Ratio. She acknowledges that while the Holy Spirit affects our
search, 175 it does not guarantee certainty.176 In his critique of Adams, Hillary Martin
admits that even great thinkers such as Anselm and Aquinas acknowledge that we
understand reality ―rather weakly and in the diluted manner.‖177 Epistemic uncertainty
mobilizing and driving force of faith‘s thinking, of its knowledge of, and reflections on, human nature,
history and society.‖
173
August Sabatier, & Jean Reville, Religions of authority and the religion of the spirit (BiblioLife, 2009),
335. ―I have carefully distinguished between faith and belief, reserving the first expression for that act of
heart and will – an essentially moral act – whereby man accepts the gift of God and his forgiveness, and
consecrates himself to him; applying the second to that intellectual act by which the mind gives its
consent to a historic fact and to a doctrine.‖
174
Sabatier & Reville, Religions of authority and the religion of the spirit, 335.
175
Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in Anthony Fisher &
Hayden Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press,
2004), 17. ―The Spirit surrounds, enfolds, nudges, tries to pull into focus, as St Paul says, ―with sighs too
deep for words.‖
176
See Hillary Martin OP, ―Comments on ‗Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in
Anthony Fisher & Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?
(Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 21. ―While Adams is a realist about reality, she is not a realist about human
knowledge of that reality.‖
177
Hillary Martin OP ―Comments on ‗Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in Anthony
Fisher & Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF
Press, 2004), 21.
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notwithstanding, Adams is not prepared to abandon reason as some more vigorous
proponents of the fiducial model advocate.178 In the face of epistemic uncertainty, most
proponents of the fiducial model propose the complete submission of will to objective
truth revealed by God, specifically to his promise of salvation. As we have seen, some
even denounce reason in their attempt to elevate faith.

Nevertheless, engaging in a submission of reason involves reason itself, moved by the
will. Thus this view is not a complete rejection of reason even if it seems to allocate to
reason a different role. At the very least, reason must be employed to discern what is
received and trusted as revelation. Reason must then engage revelation in order to
comprehend what form surrender to God would take in our own life. And reason must
be engaged in the ongoing application and assessment of our application of these
determined principles. Without reason we would be unable to distinguish true
inspirations of the Holy Spirit from delusions. Finally, even if this model of faith were
reduced to a single self determining act such as a ‗decision for Jesus‘ this would still be
an act of the mind which, as an act of surrender of the whole person, involves all
faculties of the person, including the intellect. Reason must be surrendered to God.
Despite some protestations of its proponents, this does not seem to be a rejection of the
use of reason but of reason as a source of surety in itself.

178

Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in Anthony Fisher &
Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press,
2004), 10. ―In philosophy, anti-realism strikes me as a bad bargain, ... it pays the exorbitant price of
admitting that the Truth we wanted to reach is not even there.‖
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It may be possible to apply one of Friedrich Nietzsche‘s critiques of Christianity, in a
rather more specific sense, in the case of this model of faith. Nietzsche wrote that, worse
than merely being too weak to ascend to greatness, Christian piety turns this weakness
into a virtue.179 Nietzsche denounces this ―cunning of impotence‖ as profoundly
dishonest and unhelpful if we are to acknowledge reality and strive to reach our
potential. Perhaps we could argue that, while acknowledging the pitfalls of human
reason, it would be unhelpful to allow this weakness to be ‗lied‘ into something
meritorious rather than healed, nurtured and urged into something genuinely
meritorious, the search for truth.

The Fiducial Model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
Even while expounding the compatibility of faith and reason, Fides et Ratio still warns
against uncritical reliance on philosophy in our search for truth. It points out that
philosophy has fallen into grave error in the past, especially so in recent times,180 and
that these errors have cast doubt onto the ―pure and simple faith‖ of the People of God.
It sees the duty of the Church‘s Magisterium as warning against any of these
philosophies which contradict revealed truth.181 Even in the opening paragraphs the
document emphasises the unreliability of human reason, citing 1 Cor 13:12 to suggest
that we cling now to revealed truth because in the present life we will only ever ―see in a

179

Winifred Wing Han Lamb, ―‘Truth in the Inward Part‘: Faith and the Scalpel of Suspicion‖ in Anthony
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mirror dimly‖.182 This model‘s pessimistic view of reason might seem to have some
support in Fides et Ratio‘s complaint that reason sundered from truth has ―lost the
capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the truth of being.‖183

Fides et Ratio observes that human reason is not only compromised by an overload of
data from experience184 but it might be said to be fundamentally flawed in itself.
Original sin, described as the primal disobedience, has “so wounded reason” that human
ability to know the truth has been “impaired” by its rejection of God, the source of
truth.185 Trapped by the devastating results of original sin, reason becomes “a prisoner to
itself”186 and this “inconsistency of the heart” often obscures and distorts our view.187
The effect of sin does not end with distortion of the truth. Even when people are able to
hear some of the demands of truth they “run from the truth as soon as they glimpse it
because they are afraid of its demands.”188

Philosophy, as a product of this fallen reason, has throughout history fallen into error,
especially in recent times.189 According to Fides et Ratio, certainty of truth cannot be
attributed solely to human reason but is a gift from God.190 Even this revelation itself is
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―always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our understanding”191 so that it is
only possible to understand through the gift of faith.192 Echoing the First Vatican
Council, Fides et Ratio asserts that there is a knowledge ―peculiar to faith‖ which
surpasses human reason. This knowledge is obtained from the ―most certain truth‖, God
himself.193 Without revelation this truth cannot be known with certainty.194 So the
human person assents to the truth revealed by God on the basis of God‘s guarantee of
truthfulness.195 Even further, Fides et Ratio seems to support the primacy of faith
asserted by Fideism when it says that we ―can accomplish no more important act in our
lives than the act of faith.‖196 Even in moral matters man seems unable to determine
what is good and evil without reference to the highest truth.197

Negative
It may seem that Fides et Ratio at least implicitly supports fideism, but the selected texts
above are undone by examination in context and overwhelmed by counterclaims and
clear denunciations of fideism later in the encyclical.
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F&R, 13. Also relevant are F&R, 9 “There are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God which,
unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known” and F&R, 23 “It is here that every attempt to reduce
the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure.”
192
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Fides et Ratio turns to the very revelation acclaimed by fideism as the only reliable
source of truth to demonstrate the essential role of reason in the search for knowledge.198
Not only does revelation seek to assist reason in its search199 but the witness of
revelation is that faith and reason are natural and necessary partners in the search.

Although Fides et Ratio acknowledges the impact of our flaws on the use and usefulness
of reason, the document is far from agreeing with fideism that reason is fatally flawed. It
claims, rather, that the certainty of reason is only ―partially obscured and weakened” in
its natural state,200 and that “Christ ... redeemed reason from its weakness, setting it free
from the shackles in which it had imprisoned itself”201 since it is sin that holds reason
back.202 Far from avoiding reason as misleading, Fides et Ratio strongly urges a
renewed confidence in reason‟s ability based on the fact that faith perfects, illuminates
and complements reason.203 The desire for truth is so deeply ingrained in human beings
that to refuse to search would be to “cast our existence into jeopardy.”204 We are urged
therefore to bind together in order to soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth.205

198

F&R, 16. ―What is distinctive in the biblical text is the conviction that there is a profound and
indissoluble unity between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of faith.”
199
F&R, 13. ―To assist reason in its effort to understand the mystery there are the signs which Revelation
itself presents. These serve to lead the search for truth to new depths.‖
200
F&R, 82.
201
F&R, 22.
202
F&R, 19. ―If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not
because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment
in the way.‖
203
F&R, 43. ―Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, so faith builds upon and perfects
reason”
204
F&R, 29. Also relevant is F&R, 33. ―Men and women are on a journey of discovery which is humanly
unstoppable.‖
205
F&R, 48, 83 and 84.
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―Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it,”206 specifically
seeking reason‘s assistance in understanding, interpreting and communicating the
contents of divine revelation to God‘s people and to those yet unbelievers,207 since the
truth conferred by Revelation is a truth to be understood in the light of reason208 and
exegetes ignore philosophy at their peril.209

Fides et Ratio does not suggest we accept all the efforts of reason uncritically. As we
have seen above, it properly points out examples of the mistakes that are possible when
reason unmoors itself from the port of Revelation. The document urges us to join the
Church in a properly critical assessment of systems of reason.210 It speaks of a ―critical
consciousness‖ of the Fathers in relation to philosophy as indicating that ―they were not
naive thinkers”211 but exercised intellectual honesty in order neither to accept reason
uncritically nor to engage in “a prejudiced rejection of it”.212 Nor does faith seek to
dominate reason but intervenes to ensure its proper and pure operation.213

Relying solely on faith will expose theologians to the risk, firstly, that an unreasonable
faith soon degenerates into mere superstition and, secondly, that in the use of language,
logical structures and attempting to understand what it is they believe and apply it to
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evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts.‖
210
F&R, 39. “It is clear from history, then, that Christian thinkers were critical in adopting philosophical
thought.”
211
F&R, 41.
212
F&R, 43.
213
F&R, 16. “Faith intervenes not to abolish reason's autonomy nor to reduce its scope for action.”
207

8 July 2010

Page 45

life, theologians necessarily adopt and assume philosophical presuppositions. Without a
consciously critical approach, ―theologians run the risk of locking themselves within
thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of faith.‖214 Finally, the artificial
attempt to sunder the relationships between faith and reason is an attack on our very
nature. 215 More importantly, it undermines the truth itself.

It is understandable, then, that Fides et Ratio specifically warns against “a resurgence of
fideism”216 and its variants217 which seeks to reduce the search for truth to Sacred
Scripture, to a core of dogmatic formulae, and rejects the breadth of revelation in
Scripture and Tradition, together with the doctrines which the Church has properly
reasoned from this basis.

Drawing on Pius XII,218 Fides et Ratio reminds the reader that neglecting the philosophy
that underpins traditional terminology risks misunderstanding the Church‘s teaching at
the very least.219 Thus theologians are urged to ―to pay special attention to the
philosophical implications of the word of God” in their studies.220
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F&R, 77.
F&R, 85. ―The segmentation of knowledge, with its splintered approach to truth and consequent
fragmentation of meaning, keeps people today from coming to an interior unity.”
216
F&R, 55.
217
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faith and the actual formulation of dogma have been drawn.”
218
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219
F&R, 55, cf 65. ―not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure of the propositions in which
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220
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Conclusion to the Fiducial Model
This model seems pessimistic, even deeply suspicious of reason. According to the
fiducial model, reason is flawed, perhaps fatally, and cannot be relied upon to enable us
to reach the truth about God. Even worse than mere incapacity, reason may actively
mislead us about God, leading us away from the truth. Nevertheless, reason is employed
in every aspect of this model of faith. This model first engages reason to decide that
there is a God. Second, to discern which writings to consider revealed by God. Third, to
decipher the sentences contained in these books of revelation to determine which of
these sentences contain promises of God. Fourth, to determine which of these promises
are salvific (in this model: God‘s promises of forgiveness, mercy and salvation). Fifth,
to determine that these promises should be applied to the individual reader. And, finally,
reason is engaged in the act of submission to God. Even a deliberate act of laying reason
aside (if that were humanly possible) is itself an act of the intellect, moved by the will.
While acknowledging that some truths about God are beyond human reason, this model
does not abandon the practical use of reason in its methodology, even if denouncing it to
varying degrees in its theory.
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The Affective / Experiential Model
The fourth model in Dulles‘ scheme makes a strong the link between faith and human
experience. Faith, in this model, is not a message which must be believed but an
experience of the divine which becomes the message. It might be possible to find
elements of an emphasis on human experience in faith among some Mystics, and among
various pietistic movements. Indeed it would be difficult to describe faith in any
meaningful way while at the same time excluding reference to any kind of human
experience. But in reaction to the extreme rationalism of the seventeenth century, there
sprang up a deeply sentimental view of faith. Some prominent examples include, as we
noted in passing above, the profound conversion experience of the Catholic Pascal.
Pascal‘s conversion experience led him to a new understanding of faith inspired by the
experience itself.221 The case of John Wesley (1703-1791) also led to a changed
theological view of faith, based on the experience itself. While Pascal‘s experience led
him to emphasise complete reliance on God, his personal peace in total surrender to God
forms a significant part of his account of faith. Wesley experienced ―a strange warming
of the heart‖ while hearing the preface to Luther‘s commentary on Romans read
aloud.222 He remained committed to the doctrine that we are justified by grace alone, but
began preaching a faith which he described as a personal experience and a resultant
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Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 278.
Bonamy Dobree, John Wesley (London: Duckworth, 1933), 65. ―A layman was reading aloud Luther‘s
preface to the Epistle to the Romans; and then, at about a quarter to nine, while the voice was describing
the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, Wesley felt his own ‗strangely warmed.‘
All at once he was sure that he did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given
him that the Son of God had taken away his sins, his, and saved him from the law of sin and death. Ah
yes, he had believed before, but with the faith of a servant, not that of a Son. Then, faith had been assent,
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For, 68-69.
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piety (good works). Wesley‘s ‗Methodism‖ involving a kind of subjective experience as
at least a partially determinative factor in faith, is still influential today.223

In the early nineteenth century Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) heralded a
new era in theological study of faith, developing an emphasis on individual experience
into a theology of culture as shared experience.224 Schleiermacher sought to take
account of sentiment, community, tradition and history as they are experienced and
interpreted by the individual. He described faith as the feeling of certainty that
dependence on a ―transcendent reality‖ brings.225 Edward Schillebeeckx (1914-2009)
seems to take up the theme of Auguste Sabatier (1839-1901) who taught that religious
dogmas were simply human attempts to describe a common religious experience.226
Schillebeeckx laid much emphasis on experience in regard to faith, placing emphasis on
the local community over the authority of the entire Church and an emphasis on the
individual experience of Christ over the dogmatic formulations.227 According to this
model, attempts to express the faith in dogmatic formulae are incomplete expressions of
truth so it is impossible to consider them binding on individual faith. Schillebeeckx
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Methodist ecclesial communities claim a total of over 6 million communicants worldwide (The
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Gregory Moses calls Schillebeeckx as a ―partial constructivist‖. By which he means that Schillebeeckx
believes that experience and traditional structures affect each other, as opposed to the total constructivist
who believes that the movement is one way. (Gregory Moses, ―Faith and Reason: Naturalised and
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insisted that dogmatic formulae must be open to revision on the basis of ongoing human
experience. H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) followed Schleiermacher in beginning the
study of faith with an analysis of human religious consciousness. Niebuhr emphasised
the relationship between Christ and culture, defining culture as the ―temporal and
material realisation of values.‖228 Niebuhr spoke of a culture-devoid-of-Christ as
opposed to a culture-transformed-by-Christ, advocating the latter.229 Niebuhr argues that
faith is found in every human community in the form of mutual trust and loyalty. Faith
is triadic in that it involves the individual, the community and the cause by which they
are united. The ‗cause‘ of Christ evokes the trust and loyalty which unite the
community. Jesus is present not so much in the accounts of first century witnesses but in
the experience of the community of faith.230

While Schleiermacher and Sabatier saw faith as an experience,231 George Tyrrell (18611909) saw experience as revelation by which we receive knowledge. Although Tyrrell
enters ―an emphatic caveat against the sentimentalism, or emotionalism rightly or
wrongly associated with the name of Schleiermacher‖, he insists that the spirit-life
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penetrates our knowledge, feelings and will. Therefore it is impossible to think with
Christ if we do not also feel with Him.232

In the encyclical dealing with the modernists, Pope Pius X described faith as an interior
longing for the divine that connects the individual with the divine.233 The experience of
faith which is or perhaps results from this ‗faith‘ is also considered revelation in the
proper sense. No external source of revelation is necessary nor of a higher authority.234
Dogmas proposed by the Church are not revealed truth but simply benchmarks on the
journey to truth.

Preliminary thoughts on the Affective / Experiential Model
Proponents of the affective/experiential model of faith seem paradoxically to harbour a
very optimistic view of reason, trusting reason to decipher or even determine the nature
and form of truth from experience. It is additionally positive in that it actively
encourages the search for truth within our experience of life. Discerning some kind of
sense from random happenstance requires an active reason, particularly since
proponents of the model tend to discount revelation or dogmatic formulae as
authoritative or even as reliable guidelines. Since formulae of faith written by others are
merely indicators of the authors‘ own ‗faith experiences‘, the proponent of the
232

George Tyrrell, Lex Credendi – A Sequel to Lex Orandi (Bibliolife, 2009), 16. ―Religion does not
consist in knowing; it does not consist in feeling; it does not consist in willing and doing, nor is it a sum or
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another of these aspects. It is not possible to feel with Christ, unless we think with Him, nor to think with
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Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 7. ―The need of the divine, according to the principles of Fideism, excites
in a soul with a propensity towards religion a certain special sentiment, ... It is this sentiment to which
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equal footing with revelation, and to which all must submit, even the supreme authority of the Church.‖
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affective/experiential model is left with reason alone as the final determinant of truth, if
any such thing as ‗truth‘ can be clearly identified in this model.

A problem with deciphering the divine from the mundane is related to the nature of the
Christian God. In Christian doctrine, God is, by definition, outside of His creation. If
God is not part of this world, then how can we hope to perceive him? The Christian faith
points to certain experiences of the divine, the sacraments being the primary example,
but these can only clearly be seen as divine in light of revelation; the experiences of the
outward symbols themselves do not reveal the entire truth contained within.235

Another significant concern is that experience seems to be treated without suspicion in
this model. That is, the ‗message‘ of experience is normative, or at the very least
received as ‗morally neutral.‘ As I have suggested, reason is required to discern random
happenstance from meaningful experience, but such a judgement would seem difficult
without some clear guidelines. Since the proponents of this model do not seem to base
their definition of an experience in mere pleasant sensations, how would they discern a
‗good‘ experience from a ‗bad‘ experience? In order to discern a transcendent value
from a particular experience human beings need some sort of objective criteria.236 It is
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Robert Sokolowski,
The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian
Theology (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 134. ―If the Christian God is not
part of the world, there is a sense in which we cannot hope to perceive or experience him, because he
would have to be presented as one of the kinds of things in the world, differentiated from other kinds, and
the experience that presents him would have to be different from our other perceptions.‖
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Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 80.
―If the will is to be receptive to a virtuous development, especially to being motivated by charity and
love, it must have an experience of goodness; and if the intellect is to be receptive to a virtuous use,
especially to perfection by the theological virtue of faith, then it must first have some experience of truth;
and if the memory is to be receptive to the theological virtue of hope, then it needs an experience of the
beautiful.‖
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possible some experiences may even seem to contradict the truth. Without some sort of
criteria, human beings would be abandoning themselves to be driven before the random
winds of experience.237

The model seems to leave open the question of the object of faith. What is it exactly that
the intellect grasps when a proponent of this model talks about having ‗faith‘ based on
individual or shared experience? There would seem to be nothing objective or certain
about the object of this belief, leaving individual reason with the unenviable task of
determining the object, assenting to it and simultaneously guaranteeing its certainty. The
sharing of this ‗message‘ gained from experience would also engage reason to cipher the
transmission in such a way as to effectively communicate a ‗truth‘ which could only be
obtained by one‘s experience. Presumably the transmission itself counts as an
experience for the person to whom it is being communicated, but the communication
experienced would need reason to decipher, analyse and determine its meaning.

The Affective/Experiential model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
With the proponents of the affective/experiential model, Fides et Ratio describes the
human search for truth beginning with man‟s wonder at his surroundings238 which leads
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Robert Spaemann, ―Rationality and Faith in God‖ in Communio – Winter 2005, 624. ―The good, which
does not manifest itself, or does so only on occasion, in those things that actually occur, but rather in the
quiet but inexorable voice of conscience. This voice was always understood by those who believe as the
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contemplation of creation.”
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him into a deeper contemplation of his own unique place in creation.239 This search for
knowledge is so deeply set in the human heart that it is unstoppable.240 To deny it would
“cast our existence into jeopardy.”241

This agreement goes further still in relation to human experience being a legitimate
starting point in the journey to discover truth. The daily experience of suffering ensures
that questions such as “Does life have a meaning?” cannot be ignored242 particularly in
light of our inevitable death. The experience of existence is the starting point in the
human search for truth,243 constituting a “privileged locus” for metaphysical enquiry.244
Every human being is, therefore, a seeker of truth.245

The encyclical notes that humans have recorded aspects of this search in various artistic
forms,246 even while highlighting philosophy as the greatest application of human ability
in the search for truth. It seems to push this agreement with the affective/experiential
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F&R, Introduction. ―The more human beings know reality and the world, the more they know
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246
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creative intelligence they have declared the urgency of their quest.”
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model further suggesting that people seek to shape a personal “philosophy” based on
their personal and communal experience.247

Far from being limited to contemplation of the mundane, both the affective/experiential
model and Fides et Ratio assert that “in the far reaches of the human heart there is a
seed of desire and nostalgia for God”248 and that this search for truth is one which enjoys
divine assistance.249

This search is legitimately hopeful because God intends to reveal himself to “all people,
in every age and in every part of the world.”250 Our reason is capable of discerning
transcendent truth from the experience and events,251 and so we have good reason to
hope that reason can soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth.252

One of the earliest aspects of human wonder is the realisation that we share this
existence with others like us, people who share our experiences and our search for the
truth.253 The communal nature of human beings is a revelation in itself, according to
Fides et Ratio, leading us to contemplate the meaning behind other people‘s experiences
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Weinandy suggests that Webster is so concerned about Fides et Ratio‘s support for the Experiential
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and the shared traditions of the culture in which man finds himself immersed.254 It is
within this community that man learns that to trust the wisdom and technology which
underpins and enables the community to function, is to believe.255

From the very beginning the Church has engaged with culture.256 The community of
believers is not tied to one culture257 but is described “a partner in humanity‘s shared
struggle to arrive at truth.‖258 Indeed the Church sees in each culture a limited
manifestation of the search for ultimate truth and thus offers ―different paths to the
truth.”259 The encyclical even suggests that for culture to flourish it must remain open to
“assimilating new experiences.”260 For her own part, the Church insists that each culture
be allowed to preserve their cultural identity261 and that she must pay attention to the
cultural context of her audience when communicating divine revelation.262
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retains a value for people of all societies, since ... Greco-Latin culture can in part be defined by its quest
for the achievement of a universal culture.‖
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Negative
The discordance between the affective/experiential model of faith and Fides et Ratio is
not so much in the discussion of the value of experience in the search for truth, but in
the denial of objective revelation and authoritative truth entrusted to and promulgated by
the Church on behalf of her Lord Jesus Christ.

The encyclical cites the uncertainty of experience,263 the tragic reality of the horrific
experiences of our age and the despairing nihilism it has inspired264 as reasons that we
“cannot stop short at experience alone”265 in our search for meaning. If our search for
truth is solely based on experience we risk reducing our understanding of transcendent
truth to the limits of our experience.266

Part of the problem seems to be the attribution of experience to faith rather than reason.
While Fides et Ratio acknowledges the value of experience it attributes experience and
its interpretation to reason, while faith relies specifically on divinely revealed truth.267 In
fact the encyclical distinguishes between scientific investigation based on evidence and
experience, philosophical inquiry engaging the speculative intellect and finally religious
truth which engages philosophy but is based on revealed truth.268

263

F&R, 80. ―Experience is not absolute: it is neither uncreated nor self-generating. God alone is the
Absolute.”
264
F&R, 91. ―This nihilism has been justified in a sense by the terrible experience of evil which has
marked our age.”
265
F&R, 83.
266
F&R, 97. ―An ecclesiology developed solely on the model of civil society, would be hard pressed to
avoid the danger of such reductionism.”
267
F&R, 9. ―Based upon God's testimony and enjoying the supernatural assistance of grace, faith is of an
order other than philosophical knowledge which depends upon sense perception and experience and
which advances by the light of the intellect alone.”
268
F&R, 27.
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Fides et Ratio points out that one of the dangers of relying solely on experience in our
search for truth is an “undifferentiated pluralism, based upon the assumption that all
positions are equally valid” based on a pessimism regarding truth itself.269 In attempting
to remain open to all truth claims, such pluralism necessarily denies the objective truth
claims proposed by the Church.270 Specifically, that in Christ alone we find complete
salvific truth.271

In seeking to emphasise human experience, seekers of truth are in danger of
“exchanging relevance for truth”272 which necessarily abandons hope in an answer
capable of satisfying the basic questions which began the search. While never
abandoning her search for truth in the experiences of history, the Church has always
taken great care to critically examine the input of various cultures and philosophies in
the light of the revealed truth entrusted to her.273

269

F&R, 5.
F&R, 69. ―Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal
value of the Church's philosophical heritage.”
271
F&R, 38. ―There are many paths which lead to truth, but since Christian truth has a salvific value, any
one of these paths may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus
Christ.”
272
F&R, 87. ―By exchanging relevance for truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of
satisfying the demands of truth to which theology is called to respond.”
273
F&R, 37. ―Following Saint Paul, other writers of the early centuries, especially Saint Irenaeus and
Tertullian, sound the alarm when confronted with a cultural perspective which sought to subordinate the
truth of Revelation to the interpretation of the philosophers.” Also relevant here is F&R, 55 “This happens
particularly when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow themselves to be swayed
uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and culture but which are poorly
grounded in reason.”
270
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As noted above, natural reason can easily flounder when it is cast adrift from the guiding
light of revelation.274 Without this guidance, philosophy is in grave danger of doing
itself damage,275 taking side tracks,276 straying from the path of truth.277 As Fides et
Ratio warns, “sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice.”278

Far from denying the value of experience, the Church asserts the primacy of those
experiences of the community of faith which are reliable markers in the search for truth
and genuinely transcend the everyday.279 She acknowledges that we belong to a
community and culture with a heritage which cannot be abandoned in favour of a
limited expression of human experience such as a modern ‗culture‘. So our search for
truth is properly sustained within its ―ecclesial context‖.280 It is in this context that we
can assert that revelation is indeed ―immersed in time and history‖ but that this is
concretely expressed in the incarnation of the second Person of the Blessed Trinity.281

274

F&R, 28.
F&R, 75. ―In refusing the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since
this is to preclude access to a deeper knowledge of truth.”
276
F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the
danger of losing sight of its final goal.”
277
F&R, 73. ―reason is offered guidance and is warned against paths which would lead it to stray from
revealed Truth and to stray in the end from the truth pure and simple.”
278
F&R, 5.
279
F&R, 85. ―The appeal to tradition is not a mere remembrance of the past; it involves rather the
recognition of a cultural heritage which belongs to all of humanity. Indeed it may be said that it is we who
belong to the tradition and that it is not ours to dispose of at will.”
280
F&R, 101.
281
F&R, 15.
275
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Conclusion to the Affective / Experiential Model
This model seems to express a sincere longing for the truth, but rejects the extreme
positions which propose that truth can only be reached by „reason alone‟ or „revelation
alone‟. In abandoning both the extreme of rationalism and rejecting blind adherence to
dogmatic formulae, the affective/experiential model seems to be an attempt to restore
reason to its proper relationship with the data of human experience. Although it rejects
reason as the sole source and arbiter of truth, it relies heavily on reason to discern
between experience as a message of truth and random happenstance. In doing so the
proponents of this model seem to presume that the world, and our experience of it, are
coherent. The pessimism this model seems to hold regarding dogmatic or absolute truth
is not a demotion of reason but a grand promotion of reason. Reason, in this model, has
the heavy responsibility of sifting and weighing the data of experience alone, without
the aid of revelation or magisterial guidance.
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The Obediential Model
The fifth model of faith in Dulles‘ schema emphasises obedience to divine authority.
Faith, in this model, begins with acknowledgment of man‘s inability to reach
knowledge, virtue or salvation on his own power. We must abandon all efforts to
understand, work, cooperate or in any way contribute to our own redemption. We must
instead commit ourselves to complete obedience to God as the sovereign Lord whose
Word has a sovereign claim over believers. Faith is abandonment of all attempts to save
ourselves and total surrender to God‘s saving plan.

Not to be confused with a doctrine of righteousness by obedience to the law, this model
emphasizes obedience to God as abandonment of hope and pride in our own efforts and
ability in favour of complete submission to God as the only hope for us. To some extent
this model is supported by the Old Testament use of חסה282 in a similar manner other
Hebrew words usually translated as ‗faith‘ (discussed above). The word usually means
―to take refuge‖ (usually in God).283 St Paul too points to this divine trust when he
speaks of ―the obedience of faith‖284 and ―the obedience that leads to righteousness.‖285

A genius in science and mathematics, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) retired to a monastery
after an intense personal conversion. He declared in his Pensees “[This] is what faith is:
God perceived intuitively from the heart, not reason.‖ 286 Faith, says Pascal, rests on

Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance, 449.  חסהis used 37 times in the Old
Testament.
283
Holladay, Ed. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, 111. ―To seek refuge.‖
284
Rom 1:5, 16:26.
285
Rom 6:16.
286
Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Intervarsity, 1968), 58.
282

8 July 2010

Page 61

total submission to God‘s authority. We know God through an intuition of the heart, not
by reason.287 As a Catholic attempting to promote a view of faith that seemed to reflect
the Protestants of a century before, Pascal was regarded as something of an oddity in his
time, even if he was admired for his brilliant mind.288

It was indeed a Protestant, a Swiss Reformed theologian, Karl Barth (1886-1968), who
later proposed a ‗dialectic theology‘289 that insisted faith is not intelligible: it is its own
presupposition.290 No finite creature, according to Barth, is capable of comprehending
the infinite. In fact, attempting to adhere to a ‗religion of reason‘ is a positive barrier to
true faith because it limits God‘s sovereignty.291 So to have faith is to ‗leap into the
dark‘292 but not to abandon hope. Barth spoke of abandoning false hope, that is, hope in
our own ability to know or to save, and because we abandon ourselves as saviours we
also abandon despair, since placing trust in human endeavour can only lead to despair.
True hope is hope gained by trusting God for everything.293 Nevertheless he insisted that
theology, when grounded in faith, can be a truly rational discipline.294

287

Martin Turnell, Tr. Pensees (Harvill Press, 1962), 163. ―The heart has reasons which are unknown to
reason... It is the heart which is aware of God and not reason. That is what faith is: God perceived
intuitively by the heart, not reason.‖ in Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 59.
288
Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 60.
289
Also called ―crisis theology‖ cf. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 236.
290
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 99. ―There are,
however, no preliminaries to faith, no required standard of education or intelligence, no peculiar temper of
mind or heart, no special economic status. There are no human avenues of approach, no ‗way of
salvation‘; to faith there is no ladder which must first be scaled. Faith is its own initiation, its own
presupposition.‖
291
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 116.
292
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 107. ―God is ... the justifier of those who dare to leap into the void.‖
293
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Philippians (Louisville: Wesrtminster John Knox Press, 2002), 17. ―It
was not Paul who had ‗begun the good work‘ in Philippi, nor did the Philippians themselves do so by
becoming converted. God began it. That strips them and him of all glory, all self-assurance, but precisely
therewith also of all despondency.‖
294
Henri DeLubac points out that ―To reduce everything to obedience where faith is concerned may be a
manner of saying that you do not care the slightest about truth. And it is lacking thereby in the deepest
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A contemporary of Barth, and partner in ‗dialectic theology‘,295 Rudolph Bultmann
(1884-1976) defines faith as an abandonment of our attempts to save ourselves and as a
complete surrender to God.296 Like Barth, Bultmann describes faith as ―a leap into the
dark‖ but insists this is not a risk for those of faith, because they know whom they are
leaping towards. Also associated with ‗dialectical theology‘, Lutheran philosophical
theologian, Paul Tillich (1886-1965), insisted that faith is perfected only when we are
grasped by the ultimate truth, and in being grasped we find assurance, knowledge and
peace.297

Another Lutheran theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), espoused a seemingly
Barthian view (in 1932) that all knowledge is a gift of faith and that theology is the
attempt to set forth what is already possessed by faith. Christ creates faith in us which
causes us to believe. Although agreeing with the Protestant assertion that we are saved
by ‗faith alone‘ Bonheoffer is concerned with a distortion of this doctrine which leads to

kind of obedience, that of spirit.‖ Henri DeLubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Fransico: Ignatius Press,
1987), 222.
295
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 116. ―In different ways Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and
Paul Tillich exemplify the dialectical movement.‖
296
Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Vol.1 (London: SCM Press, 1957), 330-331.
―Faith‘s obedient submission to God‘s ―grace,‖ the acceptance of the Cross of Christ, is the surrender of
man‘s old understanding of himself, in which he lives ―unto himself,‖ tried to achieve life by his own
strength, and by that very fact falls victim to the powers of sin and death and loses himself. Therefore,
―faith‖ – as ―obedience of faith‖ – is also released from these powers. The new self-understanding which
is bestowed with ―faith‖ is that of freedom, in which the believer gains life and thereby his own self.‖
297
Paul Tillich, The New Being (London: SCM Press, 1956), 77. ―Looking at God, we realise that all the
shortcomings of our experience are of no importance. Looking at God, we see that we do not have Him as
an object of our knowledge, but that He has us as the subject our existence. Looking at God ... we may not
grasp anything in the depth of our uncertainty, but that we are grasped by something ultimate which keeps
us in its grasp and from which we may strive in vain to escape, remains absolutely certain.‖
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what he calls ―cheap grace‖.298 That is, the false belief that faith in God saves even
where there is no corresponding obedience to God‘s love. While maintaining the
formula faith alone saves, he insists faith is never alone. That is, faith is necessarily
accompanied by obedience and love or it is not genuinely faith. Faith moving us to
profound obedience is the main theme for Bonhoeffer.299 Faith itself drives the act of
complete submission of life to obedience to God. Jesus did not call us to religion, says
Bonhoeffer, but to life with Him. Failure to obey is abandonment of Christ Himself and,
therefore, of Christianity.300

Preliminary thoughts on the Obediential Model
In common with the fiducial model, the obediential model is pessimistic about human
reason. It seems that, for the proponents of this model of faith, the ‗image of God‘ in
man has been so damaged by original sin that it has no effect. Where the fiducial model
urges trust in God‘s promises of redemption, the obediential model calls on man to
abandon any confidence in his own abilities. Trust in any human ability, including
reason, is therefore distrusted as unbecoming pride and doomed to failure. The only
hope for man is to humbly acknowledge his pathetic state and submit himself utterly to
the Lord, who rightly claims our obedience as proper to himself.

298

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (London, SCM, 1993), 35. ―Cheap grace means the
justification of the sin without the justification of the sinner. Grace alone does everything, they say, and so
everything can remain as it was before.‖ And, ibid, 36 ―Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness
without requiring repentance, baptism without Church discipline, Communion without confession,
absolution without personal confession.‖
299
Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 69. ―The call of Jesus ... was the call of the Word of God
himself, and all that it required was single-minded obedience.‖; 70 ―it is only to this obedience that the
promise of fellowship with Jesus is given.‖ (cf. The entire third chapter of the same work on ―singleminded obedience.‖)
300
Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 44. ―We Lutherans have gathered like eagles round the carcase
of cheap grace, and there we have drunk the poison which has killed the life of following Christ.‖
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While criticising Fides et Ratio for, among other things, neglecting to focus on the Word
of God as the only source of truth, John Webster argues that a focus on intellectus fidei
runs the risk of losing proper respect for God as utterly other.301 Webster articulates the
Protestant idea that calls for an acknowledgement of the failure of reason due to sin and
for exegetical study of the texts to find the truth.302 His Catholic respondent, Thomas
Weinandy agrees that we are called to an obedience of faith to the proclaimed Word.303
But, even with this limited view of God‘s revelation, it would seem that reason is
required to discern what truth, claiming to be ―revealed‖ by God, is to be trusted. Once
we have somehow determined that the Christian Bible is the sole source of truth, reason
must be employed to apprehend the command of God within that revelation, and to
determine how that command can and/or should be applied in a concrete situation.304

Since Scripture does not specifically address each of us personally by name, the
individual hearer must rely on reason to grasp the command of God and determine it as
applying to himself. After all, if it has not been explicitly stated in revelation that God
has promised something to Joe Smith, then Joe Smith must rely on his reason to deduce
that a revealed promise applies specifically to Joe Smith.
301

John Webster, ―‗Fides et Ratio‘, articles 64-79‖ in New Blackfriars Vol. 81, n.949, 2000, 76.
―intellectus fidei is described as the process of arranging the saving meaning of the propositions of divine
Truth... but this is theology without terror, theology without deep suspicion of arranging the truth about
God. No theology should ever dare to be positive unless it is also, at the same time, deeply conscious of
its own impossibility.‖
302
Webster, ―‗Fides et Ratio‘, articles 64-79‖ in New Blackfriars, 68-76.
303
Thomas Weinandy, ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars Vol. 81, n.952,
2000, 232. ―Nontheless, I want to emphasize that the auditus fiei is ultimately a matter ... of accepting in
the obedience of faith the truth of the proclaimed Word.‖
304
Weinandy, ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars, 232. ―Exegesis of
Scripture and of ‗the canon of Christian commentary‘ is... the enduring theological task, and so it is part
of the intellectus fidei, the doing of theology ... The auditus fidei is the object upon which the intellectus
fidei, the doing of theology, is founded and the source from which it springs and not vice versa.‖

8 July 2010

Page 65

Even then, engaging in a determining act of submission to the divine Lord also engages
the entire person, including the capacity to reason. Given that theologians of this view
build their religious views using complex reasoning, it seems their profession of distrust
in reason is not applied to all use of reason.

The Obediential Model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
While Fides et Ratio encourages the search for knowledge, surety is based on the
trustworthiness of God who reveals himself305 and to whom is owed the obedience of
faith. Indeed “faith is said first to be an obedient response to God.”306 It is in this
complete trusting surrender to God that a person can find certainty of faith.307

The act of obedience to God is described as an act that engages the entire person in a
fundamental expression of personal freedom.308 In complete commitment to God, the
obedience of faith is possible by His grace.309 Profound humility marks this model even
once the person has committed themselves completely to God. Faithful obedience is

305

F&R, 8. ―This knowledge expresses a truth based upon the very fact of God who reveals himself, a
truth which is most certain, since God neither deceives nor wishes to deceive.”
306
F&R, 13. (explicating Dei Verbum, 4).
307
F&R, 33. ―It is in this faithful self-giving that a person finds a fullness of certainty and security.”
308
F&R, 13. ―This is why the Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to God to be a
moment of fundamental decision which engages the whole person. In that act, the intellect and the will
display their spiritual nature, enabling the subject to act in a way which realizes personal freedom to the
full.”
309
F&R, 15 citing Deut 30:11-14.
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based on “fear of God”310 whose sovereignty and goodness provide us with certain
comfort.

Fides et Ratio expresses concern that many modern philosophers have lost hope in
philosophy‘s ability to seek answers to the greatest questions.311 While this concern is
related to certain regrettable trends in modern philosophy, the encyclical‘s concern
regarding the reliability of reason is not restricted to modern philosophers. It seems to
share the obediential model‘s concern that humanity‘s primal disobedience has so
wounded reason that its ―capacity to know the truth was impaired.”312 Under sin, reason
too becomes the prisoner of sin,313 helpless to reach for any meaningful answer to life‟s
big questions.

This tragic state of affairs has been evident throughout history where philosophy has
often fallen into error.314 The encyclical points out that the earliest Church thinkers
expressed profound doubts about the value of philosophy.315 The Scriptures themselves
seem to denounce ―the wisdom of the world‖ in favour of the wisdom of God revealed

310

F&R, 18. ―Such a path is not for the proud who think that everything is the fruit of personal conquest
[but] grounded in the “fear of God” whose transcendent sovereignty and provident love in the governance
of the world reason must recognize.”
311
F&R, 5. ―The hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers ... has dwindled...
rather than make use of the human capacity to know the truth, modern philosophy has preferred to
accentuate the ways in which this capacity is limited and conditioned.”
312
F&R, 22.
313
F&R, 22. ―The eyes of the mind were no longer able to see clearly: reason became more and more a
prisoner to itself.”
314
F&R, 49. ―Yet history shows that philosophy—especially modern philosophy—has taken wrong turns
and fallen into error.”
315
F&R, 41. ―Consider Tertullian's question: “What does Athens have in common with Jerusalem? The
Academy with the Church?” This clearly indicates the critical consciousness with which Christian
thinkers from the first confronted the problem of the relationship between faith and philosophy.”

8 July 2010

Page 67

in Christ crucified.316 Even when man receives divine revelation, the encyclical suggests
that reason cannot be given sovereignty over its interpretation.317

Unable to rely on reason to discover or to alone reliably interpret revelation,318 the
believer is encouraged to rely on the authoritative self revelation of God. This gift is
freely and graciously given by God and without it we cannot hope to know and grasp the
truth about him.319 While human reason can discern and grasp some limited knowledge
about God, his existence, goodness and so on, the knowledge that is peculiar to faith
surpasses human reason.320 In fact ―The teaching of the Saviour is perfect in itself and
has no need of support.‖321 Thus the human being can be defined as ―the one who lives
by belief.”322

Negative
As discussed in the fiducial model, this pessimistic view of reason is clearly rejected by
Fides et Ratio. To reject reason‟s quest for meaning is to undermine the very nature of
humanity.323 Revelation itself urges men on to a continuous and exhaustive search for

316

F&R, 23 citing (1 Cor 1:20).
F&R, 42. ―Reason in fact is not asked to pass judgement on the contents of faith, something of which it
would be incapable, since this is not its function.”
318
F&R, 15. ―The truth made known to us by Revelation is neither the product nor the consummation of
an argument devised by human reason. It appears instead as something gratuitous, which itself stirs
thought and seeks acceptance as an expression of love.”
319
F&R, 9. ―There are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God which, unless they are divinely
revealed, cannot be known.”
320
F&R, 8. ―There exists a knowledge which is peculiar to faith, surpassing the knowledge proper to
human reason.”
321
F&R, 38.
322
F&R, 31.
323
F&R, 29. ―The thirst for truth is so rooted in the human heart that to be obliged to ignore it would cast
our existence into jeopardy.”
317
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truth.324 The encyclical states that the Church not only encourages this search but that
she values reason‟s ability to “attain goals which render people's lives ever more
worthy.”325

Against the proposal that humanity finds its answers solely in God‟s self revelation and
thus does not need reason‟s search, the encyclical asserts that even though the truth
revealed by God may never have been discovered by reason, this truth is accessible to
reason once it is revealed.326 The Church sees philosophy “an indispensable help” in
understanding revelation and in communicating the truth to others.327

Acknowledging the limitations of reason, and the detrimental effects of our fallen
nature, the encyclical explains the basis of this trust in reason as God‟s transforming
grace which builds on reason‟s natural capacity and perfects it for God‟s purposes.328

In opposition to the proponents of the obediential model, Fides et Ratio asserts that
“faith has no fear of reason”329 but faith actively seeks the cooperation and assistance of
reason in their mutual search,330 because the proper object of both is the Truth himself.

324

F&R, 14. ―Revelation ... stirs the human mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually
to extend the range of its knowledge until it senses that it has done all in its power, leaving no stone
unturned.”
325
F&R, 5.
326
F&R, 76. ―Revelation clearly proposes certain truths which might never have been discovered by
reason unaided, although they are not of themselves inaccessible to reason.”
327
F&R, 5.
328
F&R, 43. ―Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, so faith builds upon and perfects
reason.”
329
F&R, 43. ―Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it.”
330
F&R, 34. ―On the contrary, the two modes of knowledge lead to truth in all its fullness.”
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Faith does not seek to replace or reject reason331 but to enhance and assist it to search
beyond the mundane to the transcendent. Not only is it possible for human beings to
come to a unified understanding of truth,332 but it is impossible to attempt to separate
faith and reason without severely retarding man‟s ability to succeed in the search.333

Not only does reason have its unique scope of action in the search, reason is essential for
understanding, interpreting and applying the truth revealed by God.334 Without reason,
faith would run the risk of “withering into myth or superstition.”335 As discussed above,
understanding what revelation proposes for belief requires at the very least a basic
application of logical principles of language and thought which are proper to
philosophy. Whether the proponents of this model like it or not, every hermeneutic has
its own philosophical basis and requires critical use, continuous and careful evaluation
before and after they are applied to the Sacred texts.336 If theologians naively ignored
the philosophical underpinnings of hermeneutics they would run the risk of “locking
themselves within thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of faith.”337

331

F&R, 16. ―Faith intervenes not to abolish reason's autonomy nor to reduce its scope for action.”
F&R, 85. ―the human being can come to a unified and organic vision of knowledge.”
333
F&R, 16. ―reason and faith cannot be separated without diminishing the capacity of men and women to
know themselves, the world and God in an appropriate way.”
334
F&R, 35. ―Revelation is a truth to be understood in the light of reason.”
335
F&R, 48.
336
F&R, 55. ―the various hermeneutical approaches have their own philosophical underpinnings, which
need to be carefully evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts.”
337
F&R, 77.
332
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It is hardly surprising that Fides et Ratio specifically denounces those who do not share
her confidence in reason338 and urges theologians to pay “special attention to the
philosophical implications of the word of God.”339

Conclusion to the Obediential Model
Of all Dulles‘ models, the obediential model seems to be the least optimistic about
reason. Even more than the fiducial model, it emphasises the flaws and limitations of
human reason to the point where it seems hopeless, even dangerous, to place any hope
in reason in the search for truth. The proponents of the obediential model, however, do
not abandon reason entirely. Reason is necessary to recognise our limitations, to
recognise the surer hope in God‘s revealed truth, to interpret revelation and for each
individual and to apply God‘s promises to those individuals specifically. The single self
determining act of surrender to God is still an act of the whole human person, including
the action and participation of the intellect and will. Reason is, therefore, utilised as a
tool of this method, even if not trusted as a reliable source of truth in itself.

338

F&R, 52. ―The censures were delivered even-handedly: on the one hand, fideism and radical
traditionalism, for their distrust of reason's natural capacities.”
339
F&R, 105.
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The Praxis Model
Confronted by examples of tragic disparity in various situations, liberation theologians
developed a concept of faith as ‗praxis‘. Faith is action towards God‘s emancipation.
Proponents of this model might claim support from the Old Testament where some
psalms, for example, ask specifically for justice, restoration from oppressors and even
vengeance against a hated enemy.340 The idea of a physical redemption promised or at
least promoted by God portrays faith is a ―subversive memory‖ which recalls the
freedom of Jesus and emancipates us from every kind of enslavement to earthly powers.
To have faith is to actively involve oneself in the ‗praxis‘ of liberation.

We may find something of a seed of this preference for the downtrodden in the writings
of William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, where he describes his home
country as ―Deepest Darkest England‖ and admonishes the Christians of that country for
their lack of concern for the poor and weak.341

When Peruvian Gustavo Gutierrez (1928 -

) published his work A Theology of

Liberation: History Politics and Salvation in 1971 he made only a few passing
references to faith as such, but they represent a significant shift in thinking. This
―Liberation Theology‖, as it is called, developed themes from certain European

340

eg. Ps 1:8-9, 3:7, 9:3-6, 34:15-22, 35:9-10.
William Booth, Deepest Darkest England and the way out (London: McCorquodale & Co, 1890), 18.
―What, then, is Darkest England? For whom do we claim that "urgency" which gives their case priority
over that of all other sections of their countrymen and countrywomen? I claim it for the Lost, for the
Outcast, for the Disinherited of the World. These, it may be said, are but phrases. Who are the Lost?
Reply, not in a religious, but in a social sense, the lost are those who have gone under, who have lost their
foothold in Society, those to whom the prayer to our Heavenly Father, "Give us day by day our daily
bread," is either unfulfilled, or only fulfilled by the Devil's agency: by the earnings of vice, the proceeds
of crime, or the contribution enforced by the threat of the law.‖
341
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theologians (e.g. Schillebeeckx and Moltmann) who had made efforts to link faith more
closely with social and political activism.342 Faith is, according to Gutierrez, ―an act of
trust... a commitment to God and neighbour, a relationship with others ... the total
human response to God, who saves through love.‖343 This ‗salvation‘, according to
Gutierrez‘s later writings, seems to emphasise the immediate and socio-political more
than the eternal. He insists that faith, while not providing a specific plan for social
organisation, demands that we work actively for a just society. This faith, lived within
human history, brings Christ‘s victory into the world in order to overcome it. He
contends that the God of the Bible is a God who acts in concrete historical salvation
within history, and that God orients history in a specific direction. Through his faithful
people, God changes the world better to resemble his kingdom. God calls his people to
be faithful to his social ideal, specifically in his constant call to uphold the downtrodden,
oppressed and powerless. In Jesus Christ, God becomes the poor and suffering whom
we must tend and defend. Faith does not end in personal belief but shines in action, in
lived faith. To believe, then, is to ―love God and to be in solidarity with the poor and
exploited of this world‖, and an engagement in the struggle for greater justice and
liberation.344 He draws on Karl Marx‘s theory that the praxis that changes history is the
way in which people discover themselves and their world. He insists there is no such

342

Gustavo Gutierrez, ―A Theology of Liberation‖ in J Wogaman & D Strong Eds., Readings in Christian
Ethics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 341. ―The theology of liberation offers us ... a
new way to do theology. Theology as critical reflection on historical praxis is a liberating theology, a
theology of the liberating transformation of the history of mankind and also therefore that part of mankind
– gathered into ecclesia which openly confesses Christ.‖
343
Gutierrez, ―A Theology of Liberation‖ in Wogaman & Strong, Readings in Christian Ethics, 341.
344
Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History, (1979; ET, Maryknoll, New York, Orbis, 1983),
17 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 156.
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thing as a permanent theology, theology brings faith to the world it finds itself in and
finds some means of bringing about the kingdom of God and returns to faith.345

Another South American, Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) suggested that human life
presupposes a ―choice of some ideal one presumes will be satisfying.‖ He suggests that
most people choose the ideal of their family or friends or, in rarer cases, someone who
embodies ideals they resonate with (such as Ché Guevara, or Christ). Faith does not
attain any absolute object but is, rather, a process of ‗learning to learn‘. What man learns
is ideologies (or a system of objects or goals), and through them new ideologies to deal
with new situations that arise in history. Faith without ideologies, he says, is dead. Faith
only makes sense if it is the foundation of a functioning ideology. Segundo too
suggested that faith must be made historically concrete through the acceptance of a
specific ideology. Although he admits adopting a Marxist ideology, Segundo denied he
did so uncritically. 346 He contends that liberation theology, when distinguished from
some extreme views associated with it, has a legitimate place within orthodox Catholic
teaching.347

345

The Theology of Liberation claims the support of Karl Rahner who, ―two weeks before his death, ...
wrote to the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima and proclaimed, ―I am convinced of the orthodoxy of the
theological work of Gustavo Gutierrez. The Theology of Liberation that he represents is entirely
orthodox.‖ Juan Louis Seguno Theology and the Church: A Response to Cardinal Ratzinger and a
Warning to the Whole Church (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985), 18.
346
Segundo claims that his ―careful epistemological critique‖, outlined in an entire volume of his Faith
and Ideologies, is evidence that ―it would only be foolish to say that, in this case, ―impatience and a desire
for results‖ has led [him] ―to turn to ... Marxist analysis.‖ Segundo Theology and the Church: A Response
to Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church, 15.
347
Segundo claims support for his theology in the concept of ―the same preferential option for the poor
that the Church as a whole has made its own.‖ Segundo Theology and the Church: A Response to
Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church, 136.
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John Paul II‘s development of a theology of work (drawing on Paul VI‘s Populorum
Progressio) seems to promote at least some aspects of a Marxist critique of capitalism in
denouncing ‗economic progress‘ as the determinative factor in culture.348 John Paul II
insists that the dignity of human beings cannot be set aside in the work place and picked
up again by engaging in more human pursuits after hours. He insists that ―not only is
culture constituted through praxis, but human praxis in its authentically human character
is also constituted through culture.‖349 In placing the dignity of work in terms of the
transcendent, suggesting that ―beauty exists to entice us to work‖ John Paul II seems to
blend Augustine, Thomas and Marx in his theology of work and culture.350 While he
seems to employ some Marxist critiques, John Paul II‘s emphasis on transcendent values
protects him from the more extreme solutions proposed by proponents of the praxis
model of faith.

Preliminary thoughts on the Praxis Model
In order for reason to deduce that mistreatment of the poor is injustice, reason must
build on the foundation of some sort of objective standard or at least draw on an
established concept of the dignity and equality of all human beings. From the Christian
premise of an all powerful and all loving God, faced with contemporary examples of
offenses against human dignity, proponents of this model are not alone in decrying the

348

Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 66. Rowland connects John Paul II‘s
comments with Alastair MacIntyre‘s critique of ―the ethos of civil society‖.
349
Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 67. Rowland adds that ―this is essentially
the same insight as MacIntyre‘s notion of there existing a two-way relationship between virtuous or
vicious practices and the ethos of institutions.‖
350
Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 67. Rowland believes this insight is
―more Platonic and Augustinian than Aristotelian‖ and connects it to the thought of ―Morris, Belloc, Gill,
Chesterton, Day [and] Santamaria.‖
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tragedies brought about by injustice. 351 But the praxis model seems to utilise reason of a
sort to imply that some sort of ideology which results in action, correcting the injustice,
as a legitimate expression of ‗faith‘ in this God. Faith, in this model seems to have a
negative focus rather than positive. It seems to place the focus of faith on what humans
should be free from rather that what, or whom, they should be free for. From Greek
Philosophers arguing for human freedom to pursue the good to the Church arguing for
freedom to love and serve God and neighbour, the focus remains positive.

The praxis model does seem to reflect an ―authentic, if obscure, perception of the
dignity of the human person‖352 but it seems that pragmatic reason is elevated into a
place of prominence over objective truth, revelation or reasoning based on revelation. A
proponent of this model would need to employ reason to develop a suitable ‗ideology‘ to
enact that ideology, or at least have considered and accepted someone else‘s, as suitable
for achieving their pragmatic ends. The praxis model seems optimistic in that it almost
assumes a kind of ‗right reason‘ in both determining and in applying ideologies to a
particular context.

351

Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 31. ―Is there anything more tragic,
is there anything more opposed to belief in the existence of a good God and a Redeemer of mankind, than
world hunger? ... Isn‘t the problem of feeding the world – and, more generally, are not social problems –
the primary, true yardstick by which redemption has to be measured? ... Marxism – quite understandably –
has made this very point the core of its promise of salvation: It would see to it that no one went hungry
any more.‖
352
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Instruction on certain aspects of the “Theology of
Liberation”, 2. ―This yearning shows the authentic, if obscure, perception of the dignity of the human
person, created ‗in the image and likeness of God‘ (Genesis 1:26-27), ridiculed and scorned in the midst
of a variety of different oppressions: cultural, political, racial, social, and economic, often in conjunction
with one another.‖
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The question remains; what is an appropriate ‗ideology‘. If that is to be derived from
revelation, how does one apprehend, interpret revelation? What is the basis of surety in
such situations? The proponents of the praxis model do not seem to be interested in
discussing objective truth as an object of faith. But without any universal guidelines it
would seem that reason is left to determine not only the pragmatic application of the
ideology to follow but to determine which ultimate ‗goods‘ one is hoping to protect and
promote in doing so.

The Praxis Model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
The praxis model seems to be proposed in communities where suffering, or at least
some perceived injustice, is a daily reality. Proponents of the praxis model of faith
would find some agreement with Fides et Ratio when the encyclical names “the daily
experience of suffering” as one of the most prominent factors that prompt human beings
to question the meaning of life.353 Since the poor and oppressed are usually the victims
of those more rich and powerful, they would take heart from the encyclical‟s insistence
that philosophy is not reserved for an elite few, but is practical wisdom for living for all
human beings.354 This suffering is a direct result of “a disordered exercise of human
freedom.” The answer to this evil is Jesus Christ, who is “the perfect realization of
human existence.‖355

353

F&R, 26. ―The daily experience of suffering—in one's own life and in the lives of others—and the
array of facts which seem inexplicable to reason are enough to ensure that a question as dramatic as the
question of meaning cannot be evaded.”
354
F&R, 37. ―It was easy to confuse philosophy—understood as practical wisdom and an education for
life—with a higher and esoteric kind of knowledge, reserved to those few who were perfect.”
355
F&R, 80.

8 July 2010

Page 77

Since faith in the praxis model is defined as a ‗subversive memory‘ which recalls the
freedom of Jesus and emancipates us from every kind of enslavement to earthly powers,
and the encyclical draws our attention to the salvific nature of God‘s intervention in
history,356 a proponent of this model would see the subversive memory of Christ as a
prompt to act to bring about justice. In this they might find some support in the fact that
the Church sets great value on reason‘s efforts to ―render people‘s lives ever more
worthy.‖357

Fides et Ratio insists that the Church has not mandated any one philosophy in exclusion
of all others,358 but encourages her children to present the truth in a way which ―meets
the needs of our time.‖359 Philosophers are urged to be especially attentive to the issues
arising in contemporary contexts. In the context of what the encyclical names ―the
current ferment of ideas‖360 philosophers are reminded that philosophy has a profound
effect on the development of culture and over personal lives.361 It would seem that Fides
et Ratio is echoing the concerns of a praxis model when it calls for a philosophy which
will provide “true and planetary ethics which the world now needs.”362

356

F&R, 10. ―Contemplating Jesus as revealer, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council stressed the
salvific character of God's Revelation in history” citing Dei Verbum, 2
357
F&R, 5.
358
F&R, 49. ―The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular
philosophy in preference to others”; also relevant is F&R, 51 “This is why no historical form of
philosophy can legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth, nor to be the complete explanation of
the human being, of the world and of the human being's relationship with God.”
359
F&R, 92. ―this certain and unchangeable doctrine, always to be faithfully respected, must be
understood more profoundly and presented in a way which meets the needs of our time.”
360
F&R, 104.
361
F&R, 100. ―The importance of philosophical thought in the development of culture and its influence on
patterns of personal and social behaviour is there for all to see.”
362
F&R, 104.
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This search for a philosophy that answers the questions of a particular culture is hardly
new. As the encyclical points out, even the evangelists in the Acts of the Apostles
display evidence of wrestling with the philosophical and cultural insights and problems
of those they preached to.363 The encyclical acknowledges that there is, in every culture,
―an intrinsic capacity to receive divine revelation‖364 and that theology has always had
the task of responding to the demands of different cultures.365 In a context of injustice of
oppression it would seem that the proponents of a praxis model could point to the
encyclical‘s reminder that philosophy has the proper task to make people‘s lives ―ever
more human‖.366

Perhaps aiming to exercise the freedom and responsibility which surpasses the law367 the
proponents of a praxis model seek a philosophical model which best captures the society
they live in and the ethical principles required to bring about peace and justice for all.368

Negative
As we have seen, Fides et Ratio points out that reason can make mistakes, and that
philosophy has taken many a wrong turn in history. 369 Speaking of the obligation to be

363

F&R, 36. ―The Acts of the Apostles provides evidence that Christian proclamation was engaged from
the very first with the philosophical currents of the time” also relevant is F&R, 70 “From the time the
Gospel was first preached, the Church has known the process of encounter and engagement with
cultures.”
364
F&R, 71. ―Lying deep in every culture, there appears this impulse towards a fulfilment. We may say,
then, that culture itself has an intrinsic capacity to receive divine Revelation.”
365
F&R, 92. ―theology has always had to respond ... to the demands of different cultures, in order then to
mediate the content of faith to those cultures in a coherent and conceptually clear way.”
366
F&R, 70. ―they offer different paths to the truth, which assuredly serve men and women well in
revealing values which can make their life ever more human.”
367
F&R, 68. ―In the New Testament, human life is much less governed by prescriptions than in the Old
Testament. Life in the Spirit leads believers to a freedom and responsibility which surpass the Law.”
368
F&R, 68. ―In other words, moral theology requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature and
society, as well as of the general principles of ethical decision-making.”
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vigilant against such errors, the encyclical warns philosophers and theologians not to
ignore these “erroneous opinions” so they can carry out their duty to defend the truth
against error.370

The proponents of a praxis model may take the Scriptures into account as a “subversive
memory” but they reject the Scriptural mandate as authoritative in some matters, to
which the encyclical raises the alarm, citing St Paul, Saint Irenaeus and Tertullian who
warned against similar relativistic errors in their day.371 In doing so they, even while
trying to achieve a noble goal, damage not only their own philosophy372 but also the
good towards which they are striving.373

True philosophy, says Fides et Ratio, must not be so fixed on attempting to be relevant
to immediate problems as to be lured into inadequate responses374 by a mistaken notion
of “cultural pluralism.”375 It must look to “the truth of the good,”376 knowing that as God
is absolute,377 the truth which draws us to him is true in all places, times and cultures.378
369

F&R, 49. ―history shows that philosophy—especially modern philosophy—has taken wrong turns and
fallen into error.‖ Also relevant here is F&R, 52. ―philosophies developed in ways which were themselves
erroneous and negative.‖
370
F&R, 54. ―Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and
supernatural truth and instil it in human hearts, cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous
opinions.‖
371
F&R, 37. ―Following Saint Paul, other writers of the early centuries, especially Saint Irenaeus and
Tertullian, sound the alarm when confronted with a cultural perspective which sought to subordinate the
truth of Revelation to the interpretation of the philosophers.‖
372
F&R, 75. ―In refusing the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since
this is to preclude access to a deeper knowledge of truth.‖
373
F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the
danger of losing sight of its final goal.‖
374
F&R, 97. ―the temptation always remains of understanding these truths in purely functional terms. This
leads only to an approach which is inadequate, reductive and superficial at the level of speculation.‖
375
F&R, 69. ―Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal
value of the Church's philosophical heritage‖, also relevant is F&R, 98 ―Faced with contemporary
challenges in the social, economic, political and scientific fields, the ethical conscience of people is
disoriented.‖
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The encyclical says that the cure to this kind of dogmatic pragmatism,379 is a renewed
focus on metaphysics. 380 Only in light of the absolute381 can a genuinely practical
solution be proposed which holds all the human goods in respect without compromising
one for another.382 A philosophy that ignores questions relating to the meaning of life
would soon become a kind of tool or accessory rather than its proper role in the noble
search for truth.383 As such it would render itself incapable of offering a proper response
to life‟s questions, or even to the circumstances it seeks to address.384 The truth which
sets us free is not confined to one culture, nor different for certain historical
circumstances 385 but is declared in public revelation as the same truth for all. To attempt
to offer freedom on the basis of a „truth‟ dictated by regional or cultural accidents is
doomed to failure. As the encyclical so eloquently says; “Once the truth is denied to

376

F&R, 98. ―moral theology must turn to a philosophical ethics which looks to the truth of the good, to
an ethics which is neither subjectivist nor utilitarian.‖
377
F&R, 80. ―It is there that we learn that what we experience is not absolute: it is neither uncreated nor
self-generating. God alone is the Absolute.‖
378
F&R, 27. ―Every truth—if it really is truth—presents itself as universal, even if it is not the whole
truth. If something is true, then it must be true for all people and at all times.‖
379
F&R, 97. ―the temptation [to dogmatic pragmatism] always remains of understanding these truths in
purely functional terms. This leads only to an approach which is inadequate, reductive and superficial.‖
380
F&R, 83. ―A theology without a metaphysical horizon could not move beyond an analysis of religious
experience, nor would it allow the intellectus fidei to give a coherent account of the universal and
transcendent value of revealed truth.‖
381
F&R, 27. ―people seek an absolute which might give to all their searching a meaning and an answer—
something ultimate, which might serve as the ground of all things.‖ Also relevant here is F&R, 69
―philosophical enquiry enables us to discern in different world-views and different cultures “not what
people think but what the objective truth is”.(93) It is not an array of human opinions but truth alone
which can be of help to theology.”
382
F&R, 25. “It is essential, therefore, that the values chosen and pursued in one's life be true, because
only true values can lead people to realize themselves fully, allowing them to be true to their nature.”
383
F&R, 81. ―A philosophy which no longer asks the question of the meaning of life would be in grave
danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the search for truth.”
And 47 “instrumental reason”, [is] directed—actually or potentially—towards the promotion of utilitarian
ends, towards enjoyment or power.”
384
F&R, 87. ―By exchanging relevance for truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of
satisfying the demands of truth to which theology is called to respond.”
385
F&R, 95. ―Truth can never be confined to time and culture; in history it is known, but it also reaches
beyond history.”
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human beings, it is pure illusion to try to set them free. Truth and freedom either go
together hand in hand or together they perish in misery.”386

It is hardly surprising that the encyclical warns against theology based on local
problems. Citing Divini Redemptoris,387 Fides et Ratio stresses that Catholics are
warned against an approach that is so focussed on the imminent that it loses sight of, or
even actively rejects objective truth.388 It goes on to explicitly denounce liberation
theologians (the main proponents of the praxis model) for an uncritical adoption of
Marxist philosophy.389

As we have seen above, the encyclical acknowledges that the immediate experience of
suffering prompts and to some extent guides our search for truth. In order to guard
against the imminent dominating our thinking, Fides et Ratio reminds us that the proper
context for theology is within the Church. The vast array of wisdom, both accumulated
over the ages and the present contributions of different fields of learning and different
cultures within the faith, helps theologians avoid the many pitfalls on the path to truth.

Perhaps an answer of a sort might be offered to the liberation theologians from the
closing paragraphs of Fides et Ratio where the Virgin Mary is offered as an exemplar of
386

F&R, 90.
Pope Pius XI Divini Redemptoris (1937), 9.
388
F&R, 54. ―Here the pronouncements of Pope Saint Pius X are pertinent, stressing as they did that at the
basis of Modernism were philosophical claims which were phenomenist, agnostic and immanentist. Nor
can the importance of the Catholic rejection of Marxist philosophy and atheistic Communism be
forgotten.”
389
F&R, 54. ―the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has more recently had to intervene to reemphasize the danger of an uncritical adoption by some liberation theologians of opinions and methods
drawn from Marxism.” Citing Libertatis Nuntius, (1984) in which the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith warns against certain aspects of liberation theology.
387
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wisdom. Though she was persecuted and forced to flee those who would take her Son‟s
life for their own selfish gain, she offered herself entirely to God, committing herself
utterly to the truth revealed by the angel. Prudence Allen takes the Pope‟s theme further
in her discussion of Mary as the „table of wisdom.‟ 390 Portraying Mary holding the
lifeless body of Christ, freshly taken from his unjust suffering and death on the cross,
Allen sees the Blessed Virgin as “Mary, the Throne of Wisdom. Her lap becomes
another table which holds the mystery of death and life.” The encyclical urges
theologians likewise, to offer their reasoning to God, and with their “fiat” to His divine
Word, they lose nothing of the autonomy of reason, and gain the very Truth which
answers all the injustices in the world.391

Conclusion to the Praxis Model
The praxis model displays an optimistic view of reason. By playing down the authority
of the Church or her teachings, the proponents of this model place their trust in reason to
determine the object of their ‗faith‘ and, especially, in the practical implementation of
their stated goals. The model seems to assume some moral principles, such as the
dignity of every human being, the goods of life, liberty and so on, which should be made
possible for every human being. Reason is necessary, therefore, for the proponents of
the praxis model in order to determine and defend these principles and in order to

390

Prudence Allen, ―Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers ― in New Blackfriars Vol 90 n.1025, (2008),
65.
391
F&R, 108. ―Just as the Virgin was called to offer herself entirely as human being and as woman that
God's Word might take flesh and come among us, so too philosophy is called to offer its rational and
critical resources that theology, as the understanding of faith, may be fruitful and creative. And just as in
giving her assent to Gabriel's word, Mary lost nothing of her true humanity and freedom, so too when
philosophy heeds the summons of the Gospel's truth its autonomy is in no way impaired.”
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determine, critique, apply and defend a suitable ideology. The praxis model seems to
rely heavily on practical, or instrumental, reason.
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The Personalist Model
The word ―believe‖ in English is etymologically connected to the word ―love‖, just as
the Latin word credere implies a ―gift of the heart‖.392 To believe, then, means to hold
the object of belief as dear, preferred, or worthy of allegiance.393 Christian faith,
according to the personalist model, is interpersonal. It sees faith as the union, or at least
the longing for the eventual union, of the human person with the divine persons. It is a
―participation in the life of a person, in the mystery of his death and resurrection... and a
sharing in the life of the three Persons of the Trinity.‖394

According to this model, knowledge comes through faith by way of an intimate
relationship with God. The earthly analogy that comes closest to explaining this
relationship is the marital embrace. When Dulles writes ―faith is a total self gift, which
calls to mind the reciprocal gift of two spouses‖,395 he is reflecting a strong Biblical
theme. God is presented as the bridegroom to his chosen people in the Old Testament,396
a theme which is further developed in the New Testament,397 portraying Christ as the
bridegroom and his Church as the bride. The gospel of John in particular, penned by

392

Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology, 19. ―Literally and originally,
‗to believe‘ means ‗to hold dear.‘ This is the meaning that the German equivalent belieben still has in the
sense of ‗prefer‘ or ‗give allegiance to.‘‖
393
Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology, 19. ―Etymologically,
―believe‖ is related to a broad range of familiar words, some archaic, like life (dear, willing), some still in
use, like ‗beloved‘ and ‗love.‘‖
394
Jean Mouroux, I Believe (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959) as cited in Dulles, The Assurance of
Things Hoped For, 179.
395
Henri de Lubac, The Christian Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1986),145-146 in Dulles, The Assurance
of Things Hoped For, 179.
396
eg. Hos 2:14-16. ―Therefore I am now going to allure her; I will lead her into the desert and speak
tenderly to her ... In that day, declares the Lord, you will call me ‗my husband‘; you will no longer call me
‗my master‘‖; Isa 62:5. ―As a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you.‖
397
eg. Eph 5:22-33 (cf 1 Co 11:3). St Paul compares Christ‘s relationship with his Church with that of a
husband to a wife. cf. Parables of the ‗bridegroom‘ Mt 25:1-13 and the wedding of the bridegroom to his
bride in Rev 19:7.

8 July 2010

Page 85

―the disciple Jesus loved‖,398 culminates in the resurrected Jesus provoking a threefold
declaration of love from Peter, a love which is grammatically and theologically linked to
Peter‘s role as Christ‘s earthly representative, the spiritual head of his bride, the
Church.399

Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) proposed that, in Christianity, the term ‗faith‘ has a
meaning unparalleled in any other faith or secular context. Christian faith is a total gift
of oneself in response to God‘s gift of himself in Christ.400 The mutuality of the
interpersonal gift, initiated by the gracious and loving gift of Christ to us, involves the
entire human person.401 Without being a merely intellectual act, faith involves the
intellect in belief. Christ is not merely ‗proposed‘ to us but instead enters history and
calls us into God‘s kingdom, involving a call to every part of his creation, to every one
of his creatures.

The intellect accepts the testimony of God which also ―resounds in the heart of the
individual‖ and in the Church‘s confession of faith.402 DeLubac sees this relational
model as taking humanity back to the intimacy of the pre-fall paradise, where man and
God related intimately and innocently.403 According to Ratzinger, this intimacy is

398

Jn 13:23, 19:26, 20:2, 21:7, 20, 24.
Jn 21:15-20.
400
cf Gal 2:20.
401
Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 228. ―Faith, if it be really
faith, is always one, always entire. It envelops the totality of its object – even in those parts of it which
have not yet been made plain, or in those aspects which have not yet been explored.‖
402
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 133
403
de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 216. ―Is it the Father‘s Garden we yearn for, or simply the warmth of
the maternal breast? Religions – and their modern substitutes – tend to give us back that warmth. To
remedy our growing old, they bring us back to our first childhood, indeed to our prenatal period. The time
399
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―‗more interior‘ to us ‗than we are to ourselves.‘‖404 Not the product of human learning,
it springs from a ―face-to-face dialogue‖ with Christ our brother and God our loving
Father.405

Although, as we have seen above, the God of the Old Testament displays the same
intimacy with his people and desire for personal relationship, describing ‗faith‘ as a
personal intimacy with the divine is only possible in the context of a clear understanding
of the humanity of the second Person of the Trinity. In contrast with the sense of
remoteness from God, Karl Adam called attention to Jesus‘ humanity. His divinity is not
the only, and for this day and time not the most important, aspect of Jesus‘ person. The
spark in him is the appearance of the divine in the human. Jesus became our brother.406
Only in the eternal word made flesh can we truly meet God ‗face-to-face‘.407

This face-to-face meeting is not a neutral exchange, but a meeting of intimate passionate
love. In this model of faith the divine communication is not mere propositions. As
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) writes ―divine love has found the means of

they restore to us is that before our history. Christianity, however, lets us back into the Garden... Through
is we share once more, not only in the youth of the world, but in the Youth of the Eternal.‖
404
Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 24. ―[Jesus] stands before us as ―the beloved Son.‖ He is, on one hand,
the Wholly Other, but by the same token he can become a contemporary of us all, ―more interior‖ to each
one of us ―than we are to ourselves‖.‖ (Citing Augustine‘s Confessions III, 6, II).
405
Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 7. ―Jesus teaching is not the product of human learning, of whatever
kind. It originates from immediate contact with the Father, from ―face-to-face‖ dialogue – from the vision
of the one who rests close to the Father‘s heart. It is the Son‘s word. Without this inner grounding, his
teaching would be pure presumption.‖
406
Rudolf Schnackenburg, The friend we have in Jesus (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997),
60
407
Schnackenburg, The friend we have in Jesus, 59. ―Christ should be seen not only as the divine
deliverer enthroned at the right hand of the Father but also as one bonded with us, the firstborn among
many brethren. Otherwise his human friendliness, totally encompassing love, and human nearness are
slighted. For although we know Jesus as God and man, we must take his humanity seriously.‖
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communicating the incommunicable.‖408 God‘s love is powerful and affects profound
changes in those he loves. According to Blondel, God‘s love is a radical programme of
divinization.409 This intimacy with the divine does not, however, allow for a familiarity
that breeds contempt. Far from promoting a kind of crass familiarity with ‗my mate
Jesus,‘ Blondel insists that we cannot enter into this relationship without ―fear and
trembling‖ before the majesty of God, coming to us.410 But, according to Hans Urs von
Balthasar (1905-1988), it is losing ourselves in this divine embrace that frees, empowers
and dignifies our intellect. Citing Bonaventure, he insists that ―the excessus of love, far
from leaving the reason behind, actually implies the highest form of intelligentia.‖411

Dulles describes a disagreement between Balthasar and certain scholastics who, in his
opinion, so emphasised the authority of God that they neglected the content of faith.412
Balthasar offers a similar criticism in response to Rahner‘s transcendental theology,
namely, that Rahner emphasises the experience of faith at the expense of the content, the

408

Alexander Dru, & Illtyd Trethowan, Trs. Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics & History and
Dogma (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 76. ―I believe that divine love has found the means of
communicating the incommunicable, not in order to oppress and brutalize man, but on the contrary in
order to join him in the intimacy of a union which cares nothing for difference of essences.‖
409
Olivia Blanchette, Maurice Blondel - A Philosophical Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 339.
―God‘s love is an exacting love. If God humanizes himself out of love for human beings, it is in order ―to
divinize us, not metaphorically, not mimetically, not anthropomorphically, but inflexibly, ‗foolishly,‘ by
crossing the metaphysical abyss, by reversing moral impossibilities, by communicating paradoxically,
through grace and within the forum of personal secrets and inviolable wills, what is incommunicable by
nature but still in an order of things, of joys and of goods that can be handed over and given in accordance
with all propriety.‖
410
Blanchette, Maurice Blondel - A Philosophical Life, 339
411
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic III – The Spirit of Truth (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005), 140.
―For, according to Thomas, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit that he sets forth with such genius all serve
to infuse into our cognitive powers an instinctus that operates by divine love, imprinting the secrets of
faith upon us and assimilating our inner attitude of faith to the mystery; in Bonaventure the excessus of
love, far from leaving the reason behind, actually implies the highest form of intelligentia.‖
412
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol.1, Seeing the Form (San
Francisco: Ignatius, 1982), 154.

8 July 2010

Page 88

fides qua at the expense of the fides quae.413 Just as Balthasar will not divide faith and
experience , he also refuses to artificially divide faith and knowledge. As we have noted
above, in the Scriptures, both Old and New Testaments, trust in God‘s promises does
not exclude knowledge.414 Dulles seems to sympathise with the scholastics‘ criticism of
Balthasar. He insists on more general definitions of faith, not clearly distinguishing it
from hope, trust, love, obedience, assent and contemplation.

Preliminary thoughts on the Personalist Model
This model of faith seems to engage the entire being of a person in an act of self giving,
which necessarily involves reason as both gift and at least joint agent of giving. This
model portrays an integrated faith, hope and love engaging the entire person in
communion with the divine. It links ‗knowing‘ the object of faith with loving the same
object. In fact it asserts that we cannot truly know without the complete self giving of
love and the loving reception of the other.

Far from eliminating reason on the basis that ‗love is blind‘, this model presumes a
relationship which is at least comprehensible enough to us to allow us to commit
ourselves utterly to the divine person. Faith, in this model, engages our reason, memory
and will completely in this living and active love with God. Reason is not reduced to a
single act of surrender. Instead, this model describes reason as thriving, even soaring to
its full potential once transformed by the love of its object. It could be argued that such a
focus on the relational aspect of faith might possibly allow a neglect of the precision of
413

Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 148.
Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol.1, Seeing the Form, 592 & 134 for Old
Testament and New Testament respectively cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 149.
414
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revealed truth, but a proper focus on the object of our affection and belief would surely
engage one in a closer and more sincere study of everything we know our divine spouse
wishes us to know of himself.

This model has profound implications for the sharing of the faith with others. At first
glance it may seem that a person could only describe how this faith-love ‗feels‘ inside in
terms of a racing heart, warm flushes, or turmoil in the stomach when confronted by the
object of affection (which, when described to a doctor would likely result in a
prescription for antibiotics). Most lovers, even in mundane relationships, would try
instead to tell you about the one to whom they are prepared to entrust their entire life
and future happiness; not so much to convince their interlocutor that their choice is
based on firm grounds, but to articulate something of the attributes of their loved one
which has drawn them to this state of devotion.

The Personalist model in Fides et Ratio
Positive
At the very beginning of human beings‘ struggle to understand themselves in order to
understand the meaning of life,415 they begin to understand that their search is one
common to all humanity. That is, they share basic conditions of existence, experiences,
and similar struggle for meaning with their fellow human beings. Set within the context
of a community of beings who draw comfort and inspiration from the fact that others
share a similar journey of discovery, they find they key to discovery within their

415

F&R, 1.
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relationship with others.416 According to Fides et Ratio human beings are, to a certain
extent, defined by relationship. As the encyclical says ―human beings are not made to
live alone.‖417 Living within these relationships would be impossible if an individual
insisted on personally verifying every proposition with objective criteria, and so it is life
in relationships that teaches human beings trust in the other as one of the keys to human
existence.418 Even the specific search of an individual is assisted and enhanced by
―trusting dialogue and sincere friendship‖, whereas a climate of isolation on the grounds
of distrust would undermine the search.419

The encyclical cites Saint Bonaventure to show that the interpersonal skills learned
through human relationships are essential in the search for truth420 because the search
for truth is a search to enter into a profound relationship with a person.421 As the

416

F&R, 4. ―These fundamental elements of knowledge spring from the wonder awakened in them by the
contemplation of creation: human beings are astonished to discover themselves as part of the world, in a
relationship with others like them, all sharing a common destiny.”
417
F&R, 31. Also relevant is F&R, 32. ―Human perfection, then, consists not simply in acquiring an
abstract knowledge of the truth, but in a dynamic relationship of faithful self-giving with others.”
418
F&R, 31. ―Nonetheless, there are in the life of a human being many more truths which are simply
believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verification. Who, for instance, could assess
critically the countless scientific findings upon which modern life is based? Who could personally
examine the flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the world and which is
generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew the paths of experience and thought which
have yielded the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This means that the human being—the one
who seeks the truth—is also the one who lives by belief.”
419
F&R, 33. ―Reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching by trusting dialogue and sincere
friendship. A climate of suspicion and distrust, which can beset speculative research, ignores the teaching
of the ancient philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the most appropriate contexts for sound
philosophical enquiry.”
420
F&R, 105. ―Saint Bonaventure ... invites the reader to recognize the inadequacy of “reading without
repentance, knowledge without devotion, research without the impulse of wonder, prudence without the
ability to surrender to joy, action divorced from religion, learning sundered from love, intelligence
without humility” (quoting Bonaventure).
421
F&R, 32. ―It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship are not primarily
empirical or philosophical. Rather, what is sought is the truth of the person—what the person is and what
the person reveals from deep within.”
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encyclical points out it is in the contemplation of God‟s love for humanity that we
discover the meaning of true love,422 which urges humanity on towards the truth.423

While this relational model of knowing may seem less exact than, for example, the
precision of the propositional model, it seems to draw a person to a deeper and richer
level of understanding than can be achieved by evidence or adherence to dogmatic
statements. A personal relationship draws the person into an intimacy with The Truth.424
As Saint Anselm says, the more the intellect learns to love the truth, the more urgently it
seeks the truth.425 As people entrust themselves to this relationship, they learn to know
and love the truth, and eagerly embrace it for themselves.426

The search for truth is, in fact, intimately linked with the search for a person who to
whom we can completely trust.427 This is why the priority of Christian preachers has
always been to invite people into a personal encounter with the Risen Christ. The
relationship itself brings about the “conversion of heart” which leads the new believer to
seek to know various particulars of the truth out of love for the one who is the whole

422

F&R, 7. ―As the source of love, God desires to make himself known; and the knowledge which the
human being has of God perfects all that the human mind can know of the meaning of life.”
423
F&R, 107. ―I ask everyone to look more deeply at man, whom Christ has saved in the mystery of his
love, and at the human being's unceasing search for truth and meaning.”
424
F&R, 32. ―Belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal
relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to
entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.”
425
F&R, 42.
426
Weinandy summarises Webster‘s objections to the ‗phenomenological anthropology‘ underpinning
Fides et Ratio by saying he believes John Paul II has undermined the ‗biblical truth‘ of man as the hearer
of the word.‖ Weinandy, Thomas ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars Vol.
81, n.952, 2000, 232. Weinandy suggests that John Paul II could have legitimately supported his
anthropology by a study of Genesis 1:26-27.
427
F&R, 33. ―Men and women are on a journey of discovery which is humanly unstoppable—a search for
the truth and a search for a person to whom they might entrust themselves.”
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truth.428 It is this love that provides the transformation and illumination so valued by
proponents of the transcendental model of faith.429

The encyclical drives this point home by offering the example of the martyrs. It is only
with an understanding of faith as a relationship with the divine person of truth that we
can we properly understand why neither suffering, nor even a horrid death could shake
the martyrs‟ love for the truth.430

This analogy of faith as a relationship does not discount reason in favour of a kind of
emotive attachment to truth. Faith cannot do without reason, nor can reason do without
faith.431 While distinguishing between the two, faith and reason work in “mutual
friendship”, each with its own role and importance.432 Fides et Ratio offers the Virgin
Mary as the clear demonstration that a relationship involves the gift of the entire person,
including the ability to reason.433 Just as Mary gave herself utterly over to the truth, in

428

F&R, 38. ―The first and most urgent task was the proclamation of the Risen Christ by way of a
personal encounter which would bring the listener to conversion of heart and the request for Baptism.”
429
F&R, 43. ―Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the
disobedience of sin and finds the strength required to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God.” Also
relevant here is F&R, 22 “The coming of Christ was the saving event which redeemed reason from its
weakness, setting it free from the shackles in which it had imprisoned itself.”
430
F&R, 32.
431
F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the
danger of losing sight of its final goal. Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling and experience, and
so run the risk of no longer being a universal proposition.”
432
F&R, 57. ―Just when Saint Thomas distinguishes perfectly between faith and reason”, the Pope writes,
“he unites them in bonds of mutual friendship, conceding to each its specific rights and to each its specific
dignity.”
433
F&R, 108. ―Just as the Virgin was called to offer herself entirely as human being and as woman that
God's Word might take flesh and come among us, so too philosophy is called to offer its rational and
critical resources that theology, as the understanding of faith, may be fruitful and creative.”
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order to bear The Truth in her womb, the Church sees the act of any person entrusting
themselves to God as an act engaging the entire person.434

It is to the Truth born in Mary‘s womb that the Church points all truth seekers. God has
revealed himself finally and definitively in the person of His Son, Jesus Christ.435 As
Augustine points out in his rebuke of the Platonists, it is foolish to seek the truth but
reject the Word made flesh.436 It is in the Word made flesh that we encounter the
―enduring and definitive synthesis‖ which could not be reached by human reason alone.
437

Indeed, we are able to come to a deeper understanding of God through relationship

than we could through mere propositions.438 God chose to reveal Himself most clearly in
the incarnation of the second Person of the Blessed Trinity439 and it is here that ―the
Whole lies hidden in the part, God takes on a human face.”440 Through Christ, human
beings now have access to both Him, the Father and the Spirit.441

434

F&R, 13. ―The Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to God to be a moment of
fundamental decision which engages the whole person.” Cf Allen, Prudence, “Mary and the Vocation of
Philosophers” for an excellent discussion on Mary as the “table of wisdom” in F&R, 108; See also
Meconi, David Vincent SJ, ―Philosophari in Maria – And Mary as the Model of Created Wisdom‖ in
Foster, David Ruel, & Koterski, Joseph W. Eds.The two wings of Catholic thought: essays on Fides et
Ratio (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2003).
435
F&R, 9 (citing 1 Jn 5:9; Jn 5:31-32).
436
F&R, 40. ―Though he accorded the Platonists a place of privilege, Augustine rebuked them because,
knowing the goal to seek, they had ignored the path which leads to it: the Word made flesh.”
437
F&R,, 12. ―In the Incarnation of the Son of God we see forged the enduring and definitive synthesis
which the human mind of itself could not even have imagined.”
438
F&R, 32. ―Belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal
relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to
entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.”
439
F&R, 11. ―The truth about himself and his life which God has entrusted to humanity is immersed
therefore in time and history; and it was declared once and for all in the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth.”
440
F&R, 12.
441
F&R, 7. ―through Christ, the Word made flesh, man has access to the Father in the Holy Spirit and
comes to share in the divine nature.” Also relevant here is F&R, 11 “To see Jesus is to see his Father (Jn
14:9).”
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In Christ, human beings do not merely come to knowledge of God that makes salvation
possible. Knowing God personally, as it were, people come to realise that God reveals
himself precisely in that salvific act.442 The divine self revelation in the incarnation of
Christ reveals a God who not only wants to be known by us, but also reveals his divine
purpose in doing so. The divine purpose is to invite us into communion with himself ,
for eternity.443

It is only Christ‘s transformation of suffering and death into the saving act of a loving
God that answers the deepest questions raised by our own suffering.444 God‘s answer is
a person. People come to know the mystery of the Word made flesh in his incarnation,
life, passion, death and ascension445 and in knowing this Person mankind finds meaning
and peace.446 Even so, Fides et Ratio insists that our understanding of this mystery will
be severely hampered if we ignore the contribution of philosophy. Our human mind
finds it difficult to grasp that suffering and death can express a gracious self giving

442

F&R, 10. ―By this Revelation, then, the deepest truth about God and human salvation is made clear to
us in Christ, who is the mediator and at the same time the fullness of all Revelation.”
443
F&R, 10. ―Out of the abundance of his love speaks to men and women... so that he may invite and take
them into communion with himself.” Also relevant here is F&R, 11 “The whole work of creation and
salvation comes to light; and it emerges clearly above all that, with the Incarnation of the Son of God, our
life is even now a foretaste of the fulfilment of time which is to come.”
444
F&R, 12. ―Where might the human being seek the answer to dramatic questions such as pain, the
suffering of the innocent and death, if not in the light streaming from the mystery of Christ's Passion,
Death and Resurrection?”
445
F&R, 93. ―The approach to this mystery begins with reflection upon the mystery of the Incarnation of
the Son of God: his coming as man, his going to his Passion and Death, a mystery issuing into his glorious
Resurrection and Ascension to the right hand of the Father.”
446
F&R, 24. ―Almighty and eternal God, you created mankind so that all might long to find you and have
peace when you are found” (citing a prayer from Good Friday liturgy).
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love,447 and yet, without the contribution of philosophy a coherent understanding of this
mystery will not be possible.448

The sacramental character of revelation invites human beings to look past the outward
signs and into a deeper relationship with the personal God who has offered himself in
this way for all, and continues to offer Himself in the Eucharist.449

Fides et Ratio insists that ―the intimate essence of God and of the human being become
intelligible: in the mystery of the Incarnate Word.”450 Not only do we come to see God‟s
self revelation in Christ but also the revelation of everything we are as human beings
and, more importantly, everything God has created us to be.451 Grasping the reality of
God revealed in Christ is embracing the truth of our own existence.452

447

F&R, 23. ―The true key-point, which challenges every philosophy, is Jesus Christ's death on the Cross.
It is here that every attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure.”
448
F&R, 93. ―The human mind, which finds it inconceivable that suffering and death can express a love
which gives itself and seeks nothing in return. ... a coherent solution to them will not be found without
philosophy's contribution.” And 23. “In order to express the gratuitous nature of the love revealed in the
Cross of Christ, the Apostle is not afraid to use the most radical language of the philosophers in their
thinking about God. Reason cannot eliminate the mystery of love which the Cross represents, while the
Cross can give to reason the ultimate answer which it seeks.”
449
F&R, 13. ―Just as Jesus Christ went unrecognized among men, so does his truth appear without
external difference among common modes of thought. So too does the Eucharist remain among common
bread.”
450
F&R, 80.
451
F&R, 80. ―In the end, the word of God poses the problem of the meaning of life and proffers its
response in directing the human being to Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God, who is the perfect
realization of human existence.”
452
F&R, 15. ―The truth of Christian Revelation, found in Jesus of Nazareth, enables all men and women
to embrace the “mystery” of their own life” and 80 “The intimate essence of God and of the human being
become intelligible: in the mystery of the Incarnate Word.”
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Negative
Though it seems strongly in favour of a personalist perspective, Fides et Ratio
acknowledges our understanding is negatively affected by the limits of human reason,453
the ―inconsistency of the heart‖454 and overwhelmed by ―a welter of concerns.‖455 The
encyclical also acknowledges that knowledge obtained via a personal relationship with
the divine is ―an imperfect form of knowledge.‖456 Such knowledge is ―not primarily
empirical or philosophical.‖457 Admittedly, this is not so much a point against the
personalist model as a warning that intimacy without attention to precise definitions
could lead to dangerous false confidence in mistaken beliefs.

Fides et Ratio warns that enjoying an intimate relationship with a personal God does not
dispense with the need for philosophy‘s continued search for precision in understanding
and expressing truth. Citing early Christianity‘s initial disinterest on the basis that ―a
satisfying answer to the hitherto unresolved question of life's meaning that delving into
the philosophers seemed to them something remote and in some ways outmoded,”458 the
encyclical argues that it would be a major mistake to abandon the search to understand

453

F&R, 13. ―It is true that Jesus, with his entire life, revealed the countenance of the Father, for he came
to teach the secret things of God. But our vision of the face of God is always fragmentary and impaired by
the limits of our understanding.”
454
F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a
person's search.”
455
F&R, 28. ―Truth can also drown in a welter of other concerns. People can even run from the truth as
soon as they glimpse it because they are afraid of its demands.”
456
F&R, 32. ―On the one hand, the knowledge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form of
knowledge, to be perfected gradually through personal accumulation of evidence.”
457
F&R, 32. ―It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship are not primarily
empirical or philosophical.”
458
F&R, 38. ―The encounter with the Gospel offered such a satisfying answer to the hitherto unresolved
question of life's meaning that delving into the philosophers seemed to them something remote and in
some ways outmoded.”
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truth by philosophy, imagining that intimacy with the Truth Himself absolved us from
the search.

As we have noted above, human relationships can be clouded by the same sin that
clouds our reasoning.459 Even having the amazing gift of a personal relationship with the
one who is Truth, we require the objective propositions of truth, together with the
interpretation and guidance of the Magisterium, to keep our relationship purely focussed
on this Truth. It is perhaps in this personalist model of faith that the need for a clear
theology focussing on the truth who is the Word made flesh is most pressing. Prudence
Allen invokes the portrayal of Mary and the Devil locking eyes in the crowds
surrounding Christ‘s way of the cross in the movie The Passion of the Christ as an
artistic portrayal of John Paul II‘s point,

Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to
defend natural and supernatural truth and instil it in human hearts,
cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous opinions. 460
It is the particular role of Theologians, says Allen, to lock eyes with the devil and
denounce his deception, while pointing and leading all to her son, the Son of God, The
Truth and our salvation.461

459

F&R, 51. ―it is necessary to keep in mind the unity of truth, even if its formulations are shaped by
history and produced by human reason wounded and weakened by sin.” Also relevant here is F&R, 13 “If
human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not because they lack the
means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the way.”
460
F&R, 54. ―Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and
supernatural truth and instill it in human hearts, cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous
opinions.”
461
Allen, ―Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers ― in New Blackfriars, 64.
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Conclusion to the Personalist Model
The personalist model is not only positive and optimistic about reason but it portrays
reason as an integral part of the entire human being‘s action in faith. Reason must first
determine the object of faith is a personal God, who desires a relationship with those he
created. Further still, reason must deduce that this relationship has been made possible
for us by God. The act of faith then becomes an act of total self giving over to this
personal God. This complete submission of self to the loving embrace of a personal God
necessarily engages human reason. Just as a lover seeks to understand and please her
beloved, so the believer seeks to understand and please his/her God. Reason is actively
engaged in efforts to comprehend and think with the personal God who is the object of
faith. In the understanding of the personalist model, this complete self giving fulfils and
enhances the entire person, including the capacity to reason, and raises our humanity to
what it was intended to be. Thus reason is enhanced, elevated and freed to truly
comprehend the truth about the object of faith, the beloved and personal God.
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Thesis Conclusion
This study adopted the models of faith described by Avery Dulles in The Assurance of
Things Hoped For as a convenient means of surveying a broad range of understandings
of ―faith‖ in the context of the Christian religion. Each of Dulles‘ models was briefly
described, including some examples from proponents of the respective models, some
preliminary observations about the relationship between faith and reason in the
respective models were offered; and, finally, by examining the Church‘s teaching on
faith and reason in Fides et Ratio, the relationship between faith and reason according to
each model was discussed. The specific questions in each case were,
Whether ―faith‖ is compatible with reason
Whether ―faith‖ requires reason.

Although the fiducial and obediential models share a certain pessimism regarding
reason, neither denounces reason entirely. Both models of faith place a great deal of
importance on revelation as the only reliable source of truth. Proponents of both models,
therefore, require reason to decipher and interpret revelation, to apply it to their own
situations and to involve reason in the complete abandonment of self to God. The single
self determining act of surrender to God is an act of the whole human person, including
the action and participation of the intellect and will. Reason is, therefore, utilised as a
tool of this method, even if not trusted as a reliable source of truth in itself.

On the other hand, the transcendental, affective/experiential and praxis models share a
certain optimism in regards to reason. In their various ways, these models of faith
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express a sincere longing for the truth, while all downplaying, if not rejecting, the role of
Christ‘s guiding hand in the authority of divine revelation and magisterial authority. The
affective/experiential model relies heavily on reason to discern meaningful experiences
from random happenstance. The praxis model relies on reason to determine the best
possible ideology to achieve the goals set, and relies heavily on practical reason to
implement that ideology. The transcendental model places great hope in reason to see
past the mundane problems and experiences of life to the transcendent truth in and
beyond them. Reason in the transcendental model is supernaturally enhanced,
enlightened and trusted to soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth.

The propositional model, together with the personalist model, portray revelation as
much more authoritative than it is portrayed in the affective/experiential, praxis and
transcendental models, but do not attempt to exclude reason in the manner of the
fiducial and obediential models. Reason is emphasised most purely in the propositional
model in that it specifically insists on the reasonableness of faith. The propositionalists
rely on the coherence of God‘s revealed truth with truth obtained from all sources,
encouraging reason to seek and assimilate the truth it finds, guided by the magisterial
authority of the Church, into the life of Christian faith. The personalist model also
displays a strong belief in the coherence of God‘s revelation with the world, but focuses
specifically on the truth of the human person in relationship with a personal God,
especially in the ‗Word made flesh‘. That God wishes to engage the entire human
person in a deep and intimate relationship, encompassing all aspects of that human
person, necessarily involves and enhances reason, encouraging and enabling reason to
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soar to its full potential in contemplation of the God who is the object of his/her faith
and love.

It is evident that all models of faith presented and studied in this paper are compatible
with reason and, in fact, require reason to be attempted, let alone successfully
implemented. This thesis has argued that, not only is faith compatible with reason, but
that all models of faith described by Dulles require reason.
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